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ABSTRACT 
Achieving network performance is a vital goal in response to the increase of inter-
organizational networks public organizations involve. The primary aim of this research is 
to examine the factors that predict performance in public management networks by 
disentangling the idea that collaboration requires both diversity and unity. Drawing upon 
diversity theories, social capital theory and management literature as theoretical lenses, 
this dissertation serves to investigate the following questions:  
1. What is the collaborative decision-making process in inter-organizational networks?  
2. How does social capital mediate the relationship between network member diversity 
and performance? 
3. How does network management strategy moderate the relationship between social 
capital and network performance? 
My dissertation answers these questions by examining Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs) in the United States, one of the regional transportation networks. 
MPOs are formal inter-organizational networks that go beyond informal and intra-
organizational networks. The focus here is on collaborative decision-making activities by 
individuals (mostly top-level administrators) who represent organizations working across 
their boundaries. This dissertation provides an important evidence of the interactive 
effects between network management behaviors and structural properties of networks on 
performance; it also contributes to the existing knowledge of inter-organizational 
dynamics in transportation planning networks. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Research  
In the late twentieth century, networks have emerged in a wide variety of policy 
domains as alternative institutional arrangements. Working together through networks 
goes beyond the boundaries of traditional governments, and thus requires public 
managers to use various collaborative management activities (Agranoff, 2007; Bardach, 
1998; Bingham, O‘Leary & Carlson, 2008; O‘Toole, 1997; Moseley & Oliver, 2008; 
Linden, 2002; Provan & Milward, 1995; Rosenthal, 1984; Van Bueren, Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2003). This phenomenon occurs at all levels of government. As public 
organizations have increasingly recognized that many complex policy problems (often 
called ―wicked problems‖) exist, consensus has developed that ―collaboration is not just a 
good idea, but a necessity‖ (Ingraham & Getha-Taylor, 2008). Vigoda-Gadot (2003) 
further pointed out, ―the questions today are not whether such collaboration is needed or 
is possible, but how can it be achieved and what transformations it will impose on the 
public sector ‖ (p.100). The popularity of networks is likely to continue to increase as 
networks have become a key type of public management structure (Alter & Hage, 1993; 
Chisholm, 2001; Mattessich et al., 2001). This supports the view that we need to ―treat 
network[s] seriously‖ (O‘Toole, 1997).  
A wave of public administration research and scholarship has recently aroused 
interest in collaboration and networks. A great deal of research has examined these issues 
from various theoretical angles, such as resource dependence theory, transaction cost 
theory and institutional theory (Rodríguez, Langley, Béland & Denis, 2007). Yet, much 
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of this literature to date has been focused primarily on ―the question of whether 
collaboration exists, on what scale‖ (Bardach, 1998, p.23), and what factors motivate 
collaboration in inter-organizational networks in the public and nonprofit sectors 
(McGuire & Silvia, 2009). Although these studies are great resources for understanding 
what networks are, why they form and how they are structured, one important area in 
need of further research concerns network performance. However, stakeholders such as 
taxpayers and involved organizations want to know whether and when the networks are 
effective; but there is a paucity of empirical literature assessing whether inter-
organizational collaboration leads to better performance (Chen, 2008; McGuire, 2006; 
Oliver & Ebers, 1998) and much of the literature and theories are of little help given that 
they choose not to focus on outcomes (Milward & Provan, 2000).  
In response, scholars have recently paid attention to the importance of evaluating 
network performance (Agranoff, 2008; Heranz, 2010). These studies (e.g., Provan & 
Milward, 1995) have empirically analyzed performance at the network level to examine 
whether collaboration yields better performance (Daley, 2009; Lasker et al., 2001; Nylen, 
2007). Such studies have been growing in number, but they remain few. Consequently, 
there is clearly a need for more empirical evidence and less rhetoric on collaborative 
performance.  
Given this understanding from the previous literature, this dissertation takes note 
of one paradox inherent in collaboration, the ―competing demands for both unity and 
diversity‖ (Connelly et al., 2008). In general, the essential value of collaboration lies in 
the synergistic effects that can rise from the diverse perspectives and resources multiple 
collaborating actors bring to the table (Huxham, 1996; Selden, Sowa, & Sanfort, 2006). 
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However, too much diversity increases the difficulty of reaching consensus. As Schruijer 
(2008, p.432) noted, ―working with diversity is key to successful collaboration.‖ 
Understanding diversity is the first step toward making collaboration work. Interestingly, 
this paradoxical nature of collaboration is analogous to the diversity-performance debate 
discussed in group diversity literature where a recurrent theme is that group member 
diversity can improve group performance; however, studies show mixed findings on the 
impact of diversity. Although some previous studies have suggested diversity has 
negative effect on group performance, the literature has shown the value of diversity. 
Inter-organizational networks, which constitute the focus of this research, are 
composed of individuals (representatives) who differ in at least some dimensions from 
different organizations. Such networks commonly bring together actors of many different 
types, thereby creating diversity. By chance and by design, network members often differ 
from each other in various dimensions, including demographics and an array of 
psychological and social attributes. Therefore, this dissertation applies group diversity 
theory to the context of inter-organizational networks. Because diversity theory has not 
yet been explicitly applied to the issue of collaboration and networks in the public 
administration literature, rethinking inter-organizational networks through the lens of 
diversity theory may prove fruitful.  
For taking advantage of the potential benefits of diversity, the group diversity 
literature has emphasized the importance of contextual factors (Jackson & Ruderman, 
1995). Indeed, the value of diversity might be contingent upon contextual factors (e.g., 
collectivism culture). Hence, to disentangle the paradoxical nature of collaboration 
discussed above, this dissertation presents moderated-mediation hypotheses that capture 
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the effects of diversity, social capital and network management on network performance. 
It is imperative to look into diversity dynamics from a social capital perspective because 
the ―nature of diversity reflects the relationships among individuals‖ (Chang, 2009, p.11). 
To examine the inner workings of networks, I also consider network management 
strategy.  
Provan and colleagues (2007) classified inter-organizational network research into 
four types based on two levels of analysis—organizational- and network-level (See Table 
1). Among the different types of networks, this dissertation focuses on inter-
organizational networks with the ―whole network‖ approach, which studies the entire 
network rather than the organizations participating therein (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). 
Though frequently discussed, this approach has been infrequently studied (Provan, Fish, 
& Sydow, 2007). To fill this gap, this dissertation adopts the whole network approach, 
which has important implications for understanding network performance.  
Table 1. A Typology of Inter-organizational Network Research 
  
Independent variable  
Dependent variable 
Individual 
organizations 
Collectivities of 
organizations 
Organizational variables 
Impact of organizations 
on other organizations 
through dyadic 
interactions 
Impact of individual 
organizations on a network  
Relational or network 
variables  
Impact of a network on 
individual 
organizations 
Whole networks or 
network-level 
interactions 
*Source: Provan, Fish, & Sydow (2007, p. 483) 
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1.2 Research Questions  
The purpose of this research is to build and test a theoretical model and hypotheses 
concerning inter-organizational collaborations. Drawing upon diversity theories, social 
capital theory and management literature as theoretical lenses, this dissertation serves to 
investigate the following questions:  
1. What is the collaborative decision-making process in inter-organizational 
networks?  
2. How does social capital mediate the relationship between network member 
diversity and performance? 
3. How does network management strategy moderate the relationship between social 
capital and network performance? 
 
My dissertation answers these questions by examining Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs) in the United States, one of the regional transportation networks. 
MPOs are formal inter-organizational networks that go beyond informal (often called 
―social networks‖) and intra-organizational networks. The focus here is on collaborative 
decision-making activities by individuals (mostly top-level administrators) who represent 
organizations working across their boundaries. In multi-organizational arrangements, 
they work together to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single 
organizations (Agranoff, 2003). 
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1.3 Significance of the Research 
This dissertation contributes to the public administration literature in several key 
ways. First, this research makes a theoretical contribution to both diversity and 
collaborative management literature by integrating attributive and structural dimensions 
of the inter-organizational network. Tolbert and colleagues (1995) emphasized that 
increasing workforce diversity and collaborative arrangements are ―two broad trends of 
reshaping contemporary organizations in the United States‖ (p.131). This research is a 
step to connect these two important issues in the public and nonprofit sectors. 
Ospina (1996) noted that many public sector organizations have been relatively 
successful at diversifying their workforce, but are still struggling to reap the benefits of 
that diversity. Public administration literature is relatively quiet on the impact of diversity 
on performance (Pitts & Jarry, 2009). Although rapidly adopted inter-organizational 
collaboration strategies in recent years may aggravate this struggle, to date, public 
administration literature has not approached the collaboration issue in terms of the 
diversity framework. The theoretical framework this research presents contributes to the 
growing body of collaboration literature by integrating the largely independent literatures 
on diversity and network, thereby giving a new perspective for elucidating inter-
organizational networks.  
Second, much of the previous diversity research has chosen a ―black box‖ 
approach, which does not consider additional theoretical constructs, and has focused on 
the main effects of group diversity and the effects of diversity are not yet fully 
understood (Pelled , Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).
1
 A few but growing number of studies 
                                                             
1
 For a detailed critique of this approach, see Lawrence (1997). 
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have recognized that context is important in reconciling the mixed findings of past 
diversity research and adopted interaction variables affecting the link between diversity 
and performance (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). Yet, an integrative framework including 
contextual contexts has been lacking (Joshi & Roh, 2008). This research attempts to 
address this gap by employing a framework incorporating contextual variables (social 
capital and management variables) and considering how different types of diversity 
indirectly affect performance. In addition, the scope of previous diversity research has 
been limited mainly to groups within an organization (for example, cross-functional 
teams, project teams, or top-management teams) and within the business setting. This 
research attempts to expand the logic of diversity from the intra-organizational and 
business sectors to the inter-organizational and public sectors setting. 
Although inter-organizational collaboration has drawn public management 
scholars‘ attention, empirical studies on network management and network performance 
have been under-researched with theoretical weakness (O'Toole & Meier, 2011). In their 
review of empirical studies at the network level, Provan and colleagues (2007) found the 
relative lack of empirical studies on whole networks. As they noted, the unit of analysis 
in traditional network research is the organization within a single network or a small 
number of network cases, and those studies mainly have been conceptual or have 
examined single descriptive case studies. This research uses a whole network approach 
by investigating MPOs as formalized inter-organizational networks; I hope the 
comparison of network-level characteristics across multiple networks will add useful 
insights into the existing body of knowledge on inter-organizational networks.  
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Finally, as Thomson (2008) indicated, collaboration research adopting 
quantitative approach is very rare. In particular, large-N network studies have rarely been 
conducted, despite their usefulness (Meier & O‘Toole, 2005). This research does not 
have a large sample, but a larger sample than any other samples in the previous research 
using a whole network approach. Thus, the findings and results in this study hopefully 
will extend our understanding of inter-organizational networks.  
In the literature of public policy and administration, public service delivery 
networks have been dominant objects of empirical analysis (Moseley, 2008). In practice, 
though, collaboration has occurred in the process of planning as well (Koontz, 2005). The 
empirical context in this dissertation is MPOs, which can be identified as inter-
organizational transportation planning networks, not engaging in service delivery and 
implementation. Therefore, focusing on transportation planning networks will provide 
new insights to the growing body of collaborative public management literature.  
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1.4 Operational Definitions 
This section defines two terms, collaboration and network, used throughout this 
dissertation. It is helpful to define these terms because prior studies have used many of 
them differently or interchangeably, depending on their discipline or context (Brass et al., 
2004; Raab & Kennis, 2009). In this dissertation, I differentiate these two terms, based on 
the public management context.  
Collaboration 
The general phenomenon of collaboration is defined as ―a process through which 
parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences 
and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible‖ 
(Gray, 1989, p.5). Thomson and Perry (2006) defined collaboration as ―a process in 
which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly 
creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on 
the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually 
beneficial interactions‖ (p.23). In addition, Bardach (1998) defined collaboration as ―any 
joint activity by two or more agencies working together that is intended to increase public 
value by their working together rather than separately‖ (p.8). Agranoff and McGuire 
(2003) defined collaborative public management as ―a concept that describes the process 
of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that 
cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations‖ (p.4). Further extending this 
definition, Bingham, O‘Leary and Carlson (2008) described that collaborative public 
management includes the involvement of public and citizens. In a similar fashion, Koliba 
and colleagues (2011) saw collaboration as ―a purposive relationship designed to solve a 
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problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints‖ (p.194). 
In short, collaboration is considered as a process of individuals (or organizations) 
working together to find possible solutions.  
Networks  
While ―collaboration is seen as a process, networks are often viewed as the 
structure through which collaboration occurs‖ (Silvia, 2010, p.20). O‘Toole (1997) 
defined networks as ―structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or 
parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others‖ (p.45). 
McGuire (2003) viewed networks as ―structures involving multiple nodes–agencies and 
organizations–with multiple linkages. A public management network thus includes 
agencies involved in a public policy making and administrative structure through which 
public goods and services are planned, designed, produced, and delivered‖ (p.4). Kickert 
and colleagues (1997) suggested three important characteristics of networks: (1) networks 
exist because of interdependencies between actors (2) networks consist of a variety of 
actors, each with their own goals (3) networks consist of relations of a more or less 
lasting nature between actors (p.30).  
These definitions coincided with the socio-ecological perspective of inter-
organizational networks. From this view, (1) individual members representing 
independent organizations that are physically dispersed and only meet occasionally as 
required to carry out the higher-level system purpose; (2) they belong to networks to 
enable them to deal with meta-problems single members cannot handle alone; (3) 
networks also rest on horizontal rather than hierarchical organizing principle: one 
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organization or member does not have a superior-subordinate relationship with another 
(Chisholm, 2001, p.104).  
O‘Toole and Meier (2011) recognized the importance of inter-organizational 
networks because they have been prevalent in contemporary public managers‘ 
institutional settings. Focusing on inter-organizational relationships among public and 
non-government organizations, Agranoff (2007) defined that public management 
networks (PMNs) are ―collaborative structures that bring together representatives from 
public agencies and NGOs‖ (p.3) and they are ―led or managed by government 
representatives‖ (p.7). He identified two types of the PMNs: chartered and nonchartered. 
The networks (i.e., MPOs) analyzed in this dissertation belong to chartered PMNs, which 
are defined as ―formally established as organized entities, often by intergovernmental 
agreement, registration as a 501c (3) nonprofit organization, by act or resolution of a state 
legislature, a governor‘s executive order, and/or through corporate registration with a 
state government representative, such as the secretary of state‖ (p.7). Although the PMNs 
have been seen in various policy areas, including environmental protection, education 
and criminal justice, this dissertation confines the scope to the PMNs in regional 
transportation planning, specifically, Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs).  
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1.5 Structure of the Dissertation  
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the research questions and significance 
of the research. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature that serves as the foundation for 
investigating the research questions. This chapter includes the group diversity theories, 
social capital theory from a structural approach and the network management literature. 
The chapter concludes with a research framework used throughout the dissertation. 
Chapter 3 provides information regarding the empirical context, Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs). The fourth chapter discusses my research methods, data 
collection and measurement approaches. Chapter 5 presents the analysis, results and 
findings. The final chapter presents my findings and a discussion of their implications.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the public administration literature, there are two important, but relatively 
under-researched questions: (1) do collaborative networks increase performance and (2) 
how does diversity affect performance? As discussed in Chapter 1, these two strands of 
research have equivalent arguments, but the literatures on diversity and networks remain 
largely independent. Thus, this dissertation uses diversity theory to explain inter-
organizational network performance. The diversity literature has stressed that the value of 
diversity may depend upon contextual factors (Rodan & Galunic, 2004). To resolve prior 
studies‘ discrepant findings on the impact of diversity, this dissertation considers social 
capital theory and network management literature as contextual factors. This chapter 
reviews the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to formulating my theoretical 
model and specifying testable hypotheses. The three major bodies of literature–group 
diversity theories, social capital theory and network management literature–that construct 
the bedrock of this research‘s theoretical model are discussed.  
2.1 Group Diversity Research  
This section focuses on the connection between group diversity and performance 
and reviews the literature on the types of diversity.  
2.1.1 The Diversity-Performance Theories  
Diversity is a multi-dimensional construct lacking a clear, universally shared 
definition (Edmondson & Roloff, 2008; Jackson & Ruderman, 1995), but it generally 
refers to the extent to which members of social units are dissimilar from each other on 
one or more attributes (Jackson & Joshi, 2010). One of the key questions in diversity 
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research is how diversity affects group processes and performance (Van Knippenberg & 
Schippers, 2007). Previous research has underscored that group members‘ diverse 
characteristics, at least partly, affect aspects of team functioning such as team 
effectiveness, team in-role performance and team satisfaction (Van Emmerik & 
Brenninkmeijer, 2009). Maznevski (1994) also indicated ―the diversity becomes salient 
only when it contributes to or detracts from the group‘s ability to achieve its goals‖ 
(p.532).  
Research on the link between diversity and performance is often depicted as a 
―double-edged sword‖ or ―mixed blessing,‖ which presents both opportunities and threats 
at the same time (Riordan, 2000). There are few consistent findings despite the large 
number of empirical studies on the effects of diversity (Horwitz, 2005; Horwitz & 
Horwitz, 2007; Sauer, Fesling, Franke, & Ruttinger, 2006; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). Two 
opposing camps, representing different theories, have guided the diversity-performance 
debate (Jackson et al., 2003; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams & O‘Reilly, 1998; Van 
Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). This section first explains key theories 
directing this diversity-performance debate.  
The pessimistic view, represented by social categorization theory, social 
identification theory and similarity-attraction theory, focuses on the negative effects of 
diverse groups on performance. The basic argument underlying these theories is that 
similarity in attributes, ranging from attitudes and values to demographic variables, 
increases attraction and thus, people prefer to work with those similar to themselves.  
Social categorization theory illustrates that people classify themselves and others 
with different social categories such as age, gender and race (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
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When social categories are salient, group members distinguish similar in-group members 
and out-group members. They are more likely to interact with in-group members than 
with their out-group members. Such categorization processes may result in 
communication difficulties, relational conflicts and less cooperative processes when 
diversity is imposed, rendering lower performance (Van Knippenberg & Shippers, 2007; 
Williams & O‘Reilly, 1998). The social categorization theory can be complemented by 
similarity-attraction theory. The similarity-attraction theory suggests interpersonal 
similarity (for example, attitudes and values) is a crucial determinant of interpersonal 
attraction. According to these theories, group members who belong to various social 
categories tend to have lower performance than groups in which individuals belong to the 
same social category (Van Knippenberg & Shippers, 2007).  
The optimistic view, including information/decision making theories, predicts 
positive effects when members with a broader range of backgrounds, functions, values 
and attitudes work together (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; Williams & O‘Reilly, 1998). 
This perspective implies that heterogeneous groups have the potential to produce better 
solutions than homogeneous groups because diverse groups include relationships among 
people with different sets of contacts, information and resources for creative problem 
solving, decision making and idea generation (Simons et al., 1999). Compared to 
heterogeneous groups, homogeneous groups have redundant perspectives and resources, 
thereby limiting their performance (Bantel & Jacskon, 1989; Pelled et al., 1999; Tsui & 
O‘Reilly, 1989; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). The increasing inter-organizational 
networks might be a reflection of this rationale that diversity may encourage innovation, 
creativity and positive synergy, thereby improving performance.  
 16 
The themes of these two traditions are evident in empirical studies. The literature 
on the effects of group diversity exhibited highly inconsistent findings. To make sense of 
the array of findings, reviewers of the literature have provided possible explanations and 
called for further investigation: (a) the results are partly contingent upon ―what kinds of 
differences constitute diversity in question‖ (Ely & Thomas, 2001); (b) different types of 
group diversity may have different influences on performance in terms of magnitude 
(Horwitz, 2005); and (c) many prior studies on diversity have not specified the impact of 
contextual factors that may mediate or moderate the effects of diversity (Van 
Kinppenberg & Schippers, 2007). Heeding these calls and applying group diversity 
discussion to the inter-organizational network setting, this dissertation employs different 
types of diversity and examines how two types of network members‘ diversity influence 
network performance, hypothesizing that social capital mediates and network 
management moderates the effects of network member diversity on performance. 
2.1.2 Types of diversity  
Understanding what constitutes diversity is a crucial presumption to assess and 
manage the effects of group diversity (Jackson, 1996; Jackson & Joshi, 2010). The 
existing diversity literature covers a broad range of differences (Jackson et al., 2003; 
Williams & O‘Reilly, 1998). Scholars have proposed typologies that may be used to 
classify different dimensions of diversity and have explained how different types of 
diversity affect group processes and outcomes (Jackson et al., 2003). For example, 
Jackson and colleagues (1995) suggested two taxonomic dimensions of group diversity. 
They argued that both ―readily detected and underlying attributes contribute to the total 
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diversity present in a group.‖ The former type of diversity is recognized by immutable 
features, whereas the latter may be less obvious and more difficult to verify.  
The typology Harrison and colleagues (1998; 2002) employ is termed surface- 
and deep-level diversity. Diversity at a surface level refers to ―differences among group 
members in overt, biological characteristics that are typically reflected in physical 
features‖ and diversity at a deep level includes ―differences among group members‘ 
attitudes, beliefs, and values‖ (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998).  
Jackson and Ruderman (1995) broadly categorized the construct of diversity into 
demographic diversity (based on gender, race, age), psychological diversity (based on 
values, beliefs, knowledge) and organizational diversity (based on tenure, occupation, 
hierarchical level). According to their argument, it is important for effective work groups 
to recognize that all three types of diversity contribute concurrently to the composition of 
work group. 
Northcraft and colleagues (1995) suggested two different levels of variety. On one 
hand are a workforce‘s category memberships, which include demographic and 
organizational characteristics. On the other hand is functional variety in values, 
perspectives and cognitive and physical resources. This grouping is similar to the 
differentiation between readily-detectable and underlying diversity Jackson and 
colleagues (1995) outlined. Northcraft and colleagues (1995) also maintained that 
cognitive diversity has more valuable effects than demographic diversity has on the 
performance of collaborative groups.  
McGrath and colleagues (1995) identified five clusters of attributes that are 
especially important for work groups. They are demographic attributes (DEM); status in 
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the work group‘s embedding organization (ORG); task-related knowledge, skills and 
abilities (KSA); values, beliefs and attitudes (VBA); and personality and cognitive and 
behavioral styles (PCB). Although the first two attributes are relatively easy to observe 
and are more immutable, the remaining three clusters are much more difficult to assess 
and much more mutable. The last three clusters of diversity correspond to underlying 
attributes and fit under the functional diversity umbrella Northcraft and colleagues (1995) 
described.  
Although researchers have often used different terms for similar definitions, a 
review of the literature shows that one commonly accepted classification is to distinguish 
two types of diversity attributes: surface-level (or readily detected) and deep-level (or 
underlying) diversity. Surface-level diversity refers to easily observable differences 
among group members in overt demographic characteristics, whereas deep-level diversity 
refers to differences among members that can be verified by interaction, such as values, 
personality and attitudes (Jackson & Joshi, 2010). Deep-level diversity is more covert and 
is related to personal characteristics (Van Emmerik & Brenninkmeijer, 2009). The 
following section explains these two types of diversity and provides empirical evidence 
on their effects on group outcomes.  
Surface-Level Diversity  
Surface-level diversity refers to observable heterogeneity, such as demographic 
attributes and organizational characteristics (Pelled et al., 1999). It is determined by 
immutable, easily observable, and simply measurable characteristics. In fact, the term 
―diversity‖ usually has been used to indicate the demographic composition of a group 
(Joshi & Jackson, 2003; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). There is an implicit consensus that age, 
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gender and ethnicity represent typical demographic attributes (Jackson et al., 1993). The 
conventional focus of the previous studies has been on surface-level diversity of 
characteristics of the group members (Van Emmerik & Brenninkmeijer, 2009). 
Demographic diversity has commonly been studied at the work group level in 
organizational and psychological research to date (Harrison et al., 1998; Milliken & 
Martins, 1996; Tsui & O‘Reilly, 1989).  
In general, the evidence for the effects of demographic attributes in groups is 
inconclusive (Jackson et al., 2003; Williams & O‘Reilly, 1996). Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) found that demographic homogeneity in a group was positively related with group 
effectiveness. Meanwhile, Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that age diversity did not 
influence top management banking teams‘ innovations.  
Demographic diversity, such as age, gender and race, is considered as low job-
related diversity and thus, they have less direct influences on group objectives and group 
work performance (Pelled et al., 1999). However, as categorization theory suggests, 
demographically heterogeneous groups may face relationship conflicts. Of course, other 
types of diversity can lead to emotional conflicts by categorization as well, but the 
impermeable characteristics of demographic diversity tend to deepen relationship 
conflicts (Kramer, 1991). This may offset work-related collaborative advantages. 
Deep-Level Diversity  
Many organizations and prior studies have limited their use of the diversity label 
to demographic heterogeneity, which includes gender, age and race. As noted, surface-
level variables have predominated empirical research on diversity (Jackson et al., 2003) 
and deep-level (or underlying) diversity has received less attention among scholars. This 
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is partly because researchers can easily measure such variables. Previous research often 
used surface characteristics as proxies for diversity of deep-level diversity, but there is 
growing acknowledgement of the influence of deep-level diversity on group processes 
and outcomes (Mohammed & Angell, 2004). For example, upper-echelons theory has 
recognized other potentially relevant types of diversity in groups including diversity of 
job knowledge, behavioral styles, values and beliefs.  
Recent studies have encouraged scholars to assess simultaneously both the 
surface- and deep-level dimensions of diversity to improve our understanding of whether 
and how different dimensions of diversity affect group processes and outcomes 
differently (Jackson et al., 1995; Van Emmerik & Brenninkmeijer, 2009). 
Notwithstanding, previous literature provides little guidance on what kinds of variables 
can be selected to reflect deep-level diversity. These variables may include various 
psychology characteristics (Harrison et al., 1998). In the following section, cognitive and 
cultural diversity are reviewed as deeper characteristics of diversity because they are 
especially relevant and useful to the study of inter-organizational network settings in this 
research.  
Cognitive diversity  
Group members‘ cognitive resources include knowledge and skills, values and 
attitudes, and personality and styles (Northcraft et al., 1995). Miller and colleagues (1998) 
defined cognitive diversity in a group setting as the degree to which [group] members 
differ in terms of beliefs and preferences. These cognitive differences tend to persist 
through time. According to Olson and colleagues, ―these are not mere differences of 
opinions on simple and insignificant matters but are divergent views on highly important 
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matters that would have substantial ramifications for the organization‖ (2007, p.200). 
Thus, the concept of cognitive diversity is often described as particularly relevant to 
executive decision making (Kilduff et al., 2000) and group performance (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996; Williams & O‘Reilley, 1998). Consistent with this reasoning, most 
research on cognitive diversity has been conducted at the top level of management teams 
or board of directors (Milliken & Martins, 1996).  
The proponents of cognitive diversity argue that the effects of diversity on group 
performance are positive. As cognitive diversity increases, a group would generate viable 
alternatives that may be essential for quality decisions (Olson et al., 2007). Drawn from a 
meta-analysis method, Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) examined the link between team 
diversity and team outcomes. They found a positive impact of task-related diversity (e.g., 
expertise, experience) on outcomes, whereas bio-demographic diversity (e.g., age, race) 
did not have a significant relationship with team outcomes.  
Olson and colleagues (2007) examined cognitive diversity of top management 
teams (TMT) in the health care industry and found that diversity yielded positive effects 
on decision outcomes measured with decision understanding, commitment and quality. In 
this study, cognitive diversity was derived from Miller and colleagues‘ (1998) definition, 
reflecting the differences of belief and preference about strategic goals.  
Using a computer-based simulation, Sauer and colleagues (2006) examined the 
multiple effects of two types of cognitive diversity: system understanding (the depth of 
understanding team members) and team specialization (the degree to which knowledge 
about system fault scenarios was distributed between team members). The results 
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partially supported a positive relationship of cognitive diversity with performance 
because no significant relationship was found with regard to specialization.  
In contrast, other studies shed light on the negative influences of cognitive 
diversity on outcomes (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). For example, Miller and colleagues 
(1998) found that cognitive diversity appeared to yield negative effects on the strategic 
decision process in upper-echelon executive groups. This result may reflect that high 
levels of diversity were not managed effectively. Studies by Meglino and colleagues 
(1989) also provided empirical evidence that value congruence among group members 
was positively associated with outcomes.  
Despite the primal influence of values on individuals‘ lives, value diversity, 
specifically deep-level diversity, has seldom been examined in the literature (Klein et al., 
2011). Values refer to ―generalized, enduring beliefs about the personal and social 
desirability of modes of conduct or ‗end-states‘ of existences‖ (Kabanoff et al., 1995, 
p.1076). Regardless of situations, values guide and predict people in deciding how they 
―should or ought to behave‖ and how they interact with others (Meglino & Ravin, 1998; 
Schwartz. 1999).  
Value differences among group members affect group processes and performance. 
If group members have clearly different values, they are assumed to have different 
expectations about each other‘s behavior. This makes it hard to reach to consensus by 
group members and to collaborate with each other (Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Kirkman & 
Shapiro, 2005). This is especially important because managers in inter-organizational 
networks must face the ―dominance of professional values‖ (Porter & Warner, 1997). 
Unlike traditional governments, the values, ethics and beliefs of network members 
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dominate their behavior (Mandell, 1990). In his study on strategic management in inter-
organizational networks, Mandell (1990) argued, ―the smooth running of the network 
depends on the degree of value congruence between members in the network‖ (p.40); 
however, empirical studies on the effects of group diversity in values have yielded 
conflicting results (Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).  
Cultural diversity  
Because inter-organizational collaborative networks consist of members from 
multiple organizations or sectors, each collaborating member in the groups is embedded 
in different organizational or sectoral cultures, generating cultural diversity in 
collaborative networks. The literature on organizational culture has developed various 
dimensions (or contents) of organizational (or sectoral) cultures (Rainey, 2003). For 
example, organizational cultures have been found to differ in terms of individualism 
versus collectivism, competitive versus cooperative behavior, uncertainty avoidance, risk 
tolerance and locus of control (Cox, 1993; Hofstede et al., 1990). Khademian (2002) 
further examined organizational cultures in the context of public sector. She suggested a 
cultural roots framework in public organizations, which included the public tasks, 
resource and environment.  
Although cultural differences may be related to patterns of behavior and group 
performance, the impact of a group‘s cultural diversity on problem-solving effectiveness 
and performance has rarely been addressed in the literature (Milliken & Martins, 1996; 
Thomas, 1999). Many of the studies limited their focus to short-term groups that ―exist 
only for the duration of their studies‖ instead of ongoing groups that are more culturally 
diverse (Watson et al., 1993). In addition, these studies have mainly focused on cultural 
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differences from nationality or ethnic background in cross-functional teams or 
multinational firms (e.g., Ely & Thomas, 2001; Watson et al., 1993; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
1997). For example, Watson and colleagues (1993) defined culturally diverse groups as 
those having both ethnic and national differences among members. Consequently, group 
diversity, resulting from differences of organizational cultures, has been overlooked, 
despite its importance in an inter-organizational collaboration setting.  
Like other dimensions of group heterogeneity, empirical findings that investigate 
the effects of cultural diversity showed mixed results. A stream of research has argued 
that culturally diverse groups are more likely to result in process losses, lowering group 
performance than homogeneous groups are (Hill, 1982). On the other hand, a 
considerable number of studies revealed that culturally heterogeneous groups yielded 
better decisions. For instance, Thomas (1999) employed three mechanisms (i.e., 
collectivism, cultural identity, relative cultural distance) to examine the effects of cultural 
diversity on groups. His study found a pattern that culturally heterogeneous groups 
outperform homogeneous groups in both complex and simple tasks, but this result 
depended on the group task and process-related feedback on group performance. 
2.1.3 The magnitude of diversity types 
Not all types of diversity generate equal consequences (Jackson & Joshi, 2010). 
Regarding the magnitude of effects, deep attributes of diversity are expected to be more 
influential for group performance than readily detectable attributes (Northcraft et al., 
1995; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999). Williams and O‘Reilly‘s (1998) 
study contended that the benefit of group diversity is often based more on variation in 
underlying attributes than on visible attributes. Empirical studies also found that the 
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diversity of deep-level group member attributes has a stronger influence on team 
performance (Harrison et al., 1998, 2002; Hollenbeck et al., 2004) because ―more 
accurate knowledge of others can be inferred from deep-level psychological 
characteristics (e.g., values and attitudes)‖ (Van Emmerik & Brenninkmeijer, 2009). Van 
Emmerick and Brenninkmeijer (2009) also mentioned that ―surface-level characteristics 
would provide less straightforward information about individuals‘ core self and would 
leave more room for stereotypical perceptions and biases. As such, deep-level diversity 
could have more straightforward implications for the group cooperation and performance.‖ 
Based on these findings of earlier studies, this research attempts to disentangle the effects 
of surface-level and deep-level diversity on network performance. It is important to note 
that this hypothesis does not specify directions, but focuses on magnitude because the 
diversity-performance relationship may depend on contextual factors:  
H1: Different types of diversity have different influences on performance, in that 
deep-level diversity has a stronger relationship with performance than 
surface-level diversity does.  
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2.2 Social Capital Research  
Heterogeneity in a work group does not automatically create positive or negative 
work outcomes because the effect of diversity on performance is a ―complex function of 
the interaction of member identity structures and various contextual factors‖ (Cox, 1995). 
It depends on the connectedness among group members (Joshi & Jackson, 2003). Thus, 
group diversity research may benefit by focusing on the network structure (Jackson et al., 
2003). To discover if the collaborative group maximizes the positive effects of diversity 
while minimizing its negative effects, it is important to examine how collaborating actors 
in the network configuration interact with each other and share information and expertise 
to achieve better performance (Chang, 2009; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Social 
capital is embedded in network relations because those ties provide individuals or groups 
valuable interpersonal connections (Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, & Beaulieu, 
2002). Therefore, a network‘s capacity established by network member interaction can be 
characterized in terms of its social capital. Despite its importance, little is known about 
the role of social capital in collaboration (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Few empirical 
studies have addressed how group heterogeneity influences interaction among group 
members from a social capital perspective. 
The value of social capital has been widely discussed in the literature, and 
scholars in different disciplines have offered a plethora of varying definitions and 
perspectives of social capital (Lesser, 2000). For example, researchers from different 
fields have discussed trust, relationship and shared norms as elements of social capital. In 
a broad sense, social capital is defined as ―assets in networks‖ (Lin, 1999) or ―assets 
embedded in relationships of individuals, communities, networks or societies‖ (Leana & 
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Van Buren, 1999). Like other types of capital, such as physical, human, or financial 
capital, social capital implies a ―source of potential value.‖ However, unlike capital of 
any kind, the source is embedded in the relationships among individuals, not existing in 
the actors themselves (Adler & Kwon, 2000; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Those 
relationships enable individuals to exchange resources and use information more 
effectively, thereby yielding better outcomes.  
Conceiving social capital as a relational concept, sociologists began to adopt 
social network analysis as a method for studying and measuring social capital. They view 
social capital through a network lens and take a network-based approach for measuring it. 
In this perspective, social capital exists in the structure of relations among actors 
(Coleman, 1988). The scholars in this structural approach (e.g., Rodan & Galunic, 2004) 
expect the pattern of interconnections among network members to influence the ability of 
that network to function effectively. They analyze the presence or absence of 
relationships among network actors and network configurations through various 
measures such as density and connectivity (Coleman, 1990).  
In their comprehensive review of social capital definitions, Adler and Kwon 
(2000) categorize [network-based] social capital into two types, depending on whether 
the definitions focus on ―the relations an actor maintains with other actors‖ or ―the 
relations characterizing the internal structure of an organization‖ (for details, see Adler & 
Kwon, 2000). The first view, which is an individualist approach, describes social capital 
as individual resources. This approach examines ―how much social capital an individual 
actor has based on features of that actor‘s network or the position of an actor within a 
network‖ (Prell, 2006). The second view, the groupist approach, conceptualizes social 
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capital as a collective good at the group (or network) level. In this perspective, 
researchers explore structural characteristics of the entire network. Coleman (1988, 1990), 
Putnam (1993, 2000) and Fukuyama (1995) are the main representatives of this approach. 
Oh and colleagues (2004) specified the second view, collective social capital, as ―group 
social capital.‖ Group social capital, as a special type of social capital, is different from 
social capital at the individual level in the sense that it focuses on how members‘ 
relationships have group work outcomes as a whole (Van Emmerik & Brenninkmeijer, 
2009).  
Scholars looking at network-based social capital on the group level have 
discussed two types of network resources: bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding 
social capital refers to ―resources that people can obtain from within-group ties‖ (Yuan & 
Gay, 2006). It fosters network cohesion and trust among network members (Putnam, 
2000). Coleman‘s (1998) closure argument also indicated that closure increases the 
credibility of information and trust within a network. In contrast, bridging social capital 
refers to ―resources people can gain from their ties with people outside the network‖ 
(Putnam, 2000).  
The bridging argument is related to Burt‘s (2001) concept of structural holes that 
is defined as ―a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts.… As a result of the 
hole between them, the two contacts provide network benefits that are in some degree 
additive rather than overlapping‖ (p.18). Structural holes exist when alters (actors an ego 
has ties with) have ties to the same ego (a focal actor), but are not connected to each 
other—for example, if actor A and B are connected to actor C, but they are not linked. 
Thus, the ego networks with many structural holes can access to unique sources of 
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information or knowledge. Without structural holes, the group is unwilling to accept 
ideas developing from outside the group (Oh, Labianca & Chung, 2006). Therefore, the 
presence of structural holes is expected to play an important role in network performance 
(Ahuja, 2000; Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness & Michael, 2007). Burt (2001; 2005) 
discusses how bridging structural holes (weak ties) within and across benefit groups by 
introducing new information. As Burt (2005) emphasized, ―bridging (or brokerage) is 
critical for creating information variation, while bonding are valuable for eliminating 
variation and protecting connected people from information inconsistent with what they 
already know‖ (p.25). Recent studies argue that both bonding and bridging social capital 
are important to achieve better performance. Oh, Labianca and Chung (2006) suggested 
an optimal level of bonding and bridging exists for better performance.  
Observing that two perspectives on diversity-performance are parallel to the 
literature of social capital, Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) and Reagans and colleagues 
(2004) drew on social capital theory to resolve the inconsistent results of the diversity-
performance debate. They argued that the contrasting views on the effects of diversity on 
performance could be reframed in terms of the network-based social capital variables that 
reflect distinct forms of social capital (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).  
Following Reagans and Zuckerman‘s (2001) approach, this dissertation models 
group social capital as a mediating variable. Moving the focus from the group to network, 
both diversity characteristics and network configurations are examined to explain 
network performance. Regarding network-based social capital, this dissertation 
specifically focuses on two concepts: bonding and bridging social capital, the most 
relevant concepts of social capital to the diversity-performance debate and examines how 
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they affect network performance. Sociologists have measured them with different 
concepts such as network density and external range. Network density refers to the 
average strength of connection between network members and external range is defined 
as the amount of range in the group‘s external connection (Reagans et al., 2004).  
Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) argued that the primary basis of conflict between 
two perspectives lies in the fact that diversity has been used as a proxy for network 
patterns in existing literature. In fact, many prior studies have assumed that individuals‘ 
social network and demographic characteristics can be used interchangeably. One 
rationale is that they assume network patterns are characterized by a significant amount 
of homophily (Lawrence, 1997). However, as Lawrence (1997) criticized, empirical 
evidence has revealed that not all groups show a strong tendency toward homophily, 
enough to justify using diversity as a proxy for network variables. The fact demographic 
diversity data are more accessible in comparison to social network data can be another 
reason to use diversity measures as proxies for network variables (Pfeffer, 1982).  
Reagans and Zuckerman‘s (2001) basic argument is that the effect of group 
diversity on performance is mediated by network-based social capital variables. In their 
causal model underlying the diversity-performance debate, increasing diversity is 
expected to restrict a group‘s internal density (diverse group members are presumed to 
have relatively weak relationships with one another) and enhances external range (diverse 
group members are presumed to be able to reach different constituencies outside the 
group), and each network variable has a positive effect on performance. The pessimistic 
perspective on diversity, focusing on local interactions, involves the concept of network 
density or social network closure (Coleman, 1988, 1990). This view expects less diverse 
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groups to yield better performance because such groups are thought to have a high level 
of network density. Increases in network density lead to enhanced coordination capacity, 
resulting in a higher level of performance. On the other hand, the optimistic view focuses 
on global structural holes and benefits by brokering those holes (Burt, 1982). In this view, 
diverse groups improve performance because diverse group members generate the 
relationships across groups. In other words, they allocate more of their network time to 
intergroup interactions‖ (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).  
 
Figure 1. Local Versus Global Structural Holes 
   
*Source: Reagans and Zuckerman (2001); Reagans, Zuckerman and McEvily (2004) 
 
Since these two network variables are distinct mechanisms operating 
independently and apply at different locations–local and global structural holes (see 
Figure 1)–in the social structure (Burt, 2000, 2001; Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998), the 
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opposing views of diversity-performance do not contradict (Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2001). In other words, the causal path of diversity, network-based social capital variables, 
and performance they presented is compatible with both the optimistic and the 
pessimistic perspectives on diversity. Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) criticized the fact 
that existing empirical evidence on the diversity-performance link considered one but not 
the other network variable and did not analyze them directly, thereby showing the mixed 
results with respect to the performance impact of diversity. Figure 2 depicts their causal 
model linking demographic diversity to network variables and team performance.  
Figure 2. Causal Structure Linking Demographic Diversity to Network Variables  
and Team Performance 
 
*Source: Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily (2004, p.103) 
 
This causal structure linking diversity to network-based social capital variables 
and linking those network variables to performance is applied to the theoretical model of 
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this dissertation. As expanding the above deliberation to the inter-organizational network, 
the following hypotheses are proposed:  
H2: The greater the network member diversity in inter-organizational networks, 
the lower the network density in the networks.  
2-1: The greater the surface-level diversity (gender) in networks, the lower 
network density in the networks.  
2-2: The greater the deep-level diversity (organizational culture) in networks, 
the lower network density in the networks. 
H3: The greater the network member diversity in inter-organizational networks, 
the higher the external range in the networks.  
3-1: The greater the surface-level diversity in networks, the higher the 
external range in the networks.  
3-2: The greater the deep-level diversity in networks the higher the external 
range in the networks.  
H4: The greater the density in a network, the higher its network performance. 
H5: The greater the external range in a network, the higher its network 
performance.  
H6: Network-based social capital variables mediate the effects of the diversity on 
performance. 
6-1: Network-based social capital variables mediate the effects of the 
surface-level diversity on performance. 
6-2: Network-based social capital variables mediate the effects of the deep-
level diversity on performance.  
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2.3 Network Management Research  
As Agranoff (2004) notes, ―how to manage in a network is an important 21
st
 
century issue‖ (p.62). Research on network management and structure in public 
management literature has been developed mainly from the studies in intergovernmental 
relations, which is based on complex vertical and horizontal relationships among all 
levels of government entities (Berry et al., 2004). Intergovernmental scholars argued that 
network management is imperative to run intergovernmental programs effectively 
(Agranoff, 1986; Gage & Mandell, 1990). From the late 1980s, public management 
scholars started to look at network participants‘ managerial behaviors and skills.  
The shift from hierarchy to network is accompanied with a structural change as 
well as a cognitive change (Ansell, 2000). The collaborative governance perspective has 
been predominant in network and collaboration studies (Berry et al., 2004). Network 
structure and the position of each organization in the network have been addressed in the 
public administration literature. Although this structural approach is important in 
understanding networks, there are some criticisms that the network approach is not 
capable of explaining the network performance, but only of providing a description (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2000).  
Considering the fact networks become common public management structures, it 
is important to understand the ways in which public managers form the outputs and 
outcomes of public policy in networks (O'Toole & Meier, 2000). O‘Toole (2000) argued 
that management is more important in a network setting than in a hierarchy because, in a 
network, ―managers must spend more time on maintenance within the structure because 
the network is less inertial and [they also] spend more time on interaction with the 
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environment because the structure is more open to environmental influences‖ (O'Toole & 
Meier, 2000, p. 275). Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) also stated that network management 
should be part of standard operating procedures. 
However, network management as a cognitive approach has been largely 
overlooked in the literature (Ansell, 2000; Walker et al., 2007). Public management 
scholars appear to have assumptions that networks should be managed in a different 
manner than hierarchies (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). 
For instance, O‘Toole and Meier (2000) indicated two key differences between 
hierarchies and networks in terms of management. In more networked contexts, 
challenges commonly arise from the uncertainties and complexities of the structurally 
ambiguous setting itself, and multiple directions or actors rather than a single locus 
attempt to manage networks.  
Network management aims at improving cooperation among network actors with 
different goals and preferences, thereby ―mediating and coordinating inter-organizational 
policy making‖ (O‘Toole, 1988). Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) described network 
management as ―promoting the mutual adjustment of the behavior of actors with diverse 
objectives and ambitions with regard to tackling problems within a given framework of 
inter-organizational relationships‖ (p.44). They recognized two types of network 
management: game management and network structuring. Game management is about 
―managing interactions within networks‖ and involves five types of strategies: network 
activation, arranging interaction, brokerage, facilitating interaction and conflict 
management (mediation and arbitration). Network structuring is about ―tinkering with the 
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network‖ and involves mobilizing new coalitions, managing by chaos and influencing 
formal policy, interrelationships, values, norms and perceptions.  
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) proposed similar types of network management. 
Their framework, further extended by McGuire (2002), identified four types of network 
actors‘ behaviors: activation, framing, mobilization and synthesizing (pp.602-3). 
Activation is defined as a set of behaviors employed for ―identifying and incorporating 
the persons and resources needed to achieve program goals.‖ Framing behaviors are used 
to ―arrange and integrate a network structure by facilitating agreement on participant‘s 
roles, operating rules and network values.‖ These two types of behaviors involve the 
formation of the network structure. Other network management behaviors are mobilizing 
behaviors to ―develop commitment and support for network processes from network 
participants and external stakeholders,‖ and synthesizing behaviors used to ―create an 
environment and enhance the conditions for favorable, productive interaction among 
network participants.‖ These network behaviors are related to maintaining and 
developing existing networks. Table 2 shows a summary of the network management 
behaviors Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) identified.  
Table 2. Functions by Game and Networks 
 Activation Framing Synthesizing Mobilizing 
Games Directing attention 
of network 
participants 
to/away from 
game  
Framing issue 
using existing 
―constructions‖ of 
dependence 
Conflict 
resolution, 
―fixing,‖ using 
existing network 
structures 
Motivating active/ 
enhanced 
participation in 
games especially 
through mass 
mobilization  
Networks Directing attention 
of participants/ 
nonparticipants of 
network 
Creating/updating 
―constructions‖ of 
dependence  
Norm building, 
altering existing 
network 
structures 
Integrating 
existing 
participants/sociali
zing new 
participants 
*Source: Rethemeyer & Hatmaker (2008, p. 637) 
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Despite its importance, there is an overall paucity of research that examines the 
actions and behaviors of network participants (McGuire & Silvia, 2009) and the impact 
of network management on performance (O‘Toole & Meier, 2004), especially in PMNs. 
In their series of studies (Meier & O‘Toole, 2001; O‘Toole & Meier, 1999; 2004), 
O‘Toole and Meier suggested a formal model to link between network management and 
performance and called for more empirical research on network management.  
Diversity management has received great attention in the private sector 
(Maznevski, 1994). Many group diversity scholars also argue that, for successful 
collaborative networks, the assets and the liabilities related to diversity should be 
effectively managed (Jackson, 1996). Likewise, PMNs need to be guided to make 
constructive use of diversity to increase network performance.  
In this research, network members‘ managerial actions are considered as 
moderating variables that affect the strength of association between the mediating effect 
of social capital and network performance. Hence, I hypothesize the following:  
H7: Network management (mobilizing and synthesizing) moderates the mediating 
effects of social capital variables (internal density and external range) on the 
diversity-performance relationship, such that these effects are stronger when 
the use of network management is active than when it is not.  
7-1: Network management behaviors positively increase the effect of internal 
density on network performance.  
7-2: Network management behaviors positively increase the effect of external 
range on network performance.  
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2.4 Network Performance Research 
Despite the growing necessity of examining the consequences of collaboration, 
efforts to evaluate networks have been largely lacking (Provan & Milward, 2001). There 
is a paucity of empirical literature assessing whether inter-organizational collaboration 
produces better performance (Chen, 2008; McGuire, 2006; Oliver & Ebers, 1998).  
Measuring performance is difficult even in a single public organization and it 
requires a ―complex mosaic of indicators‖ (Jackson, 1988). Ostrom (1999) indicated the 
difficulties of measuring the output of local public agencies and suggested multiple 
measures of output derived from multiple modes of data collection (e.g., survey, agency 
records and citizen interviews) to understand productivity of public agencies. 
Collaborative arrangements among multiple organizations may make the performance 
evaluation more intricate. The involvement of multiple organizations and their various 
needs and expectations may make resolving conflicts and evaluating network 
performance much more difficult (Mayne & Rieper, 2003). Reaching a consensus in 
―cross-sectoral collaborations are presumably even more difficult because the 
fundamentally different missions can create unexpected inter-organizational conflicts for 
partners‖ (Chen, 2008, p. 349).  
Clearly, measuring network performance is fraught with complexities, especially 
in the public sector, but it is critical for decision makers in public policy. Such 
measurement is important to evaluate the current status of network for learning, 
allocating budget, motivating network members and improving overall performance 
(Behn, 2003). Therefore, while acknowledging the inherent difficulties in such attempts, 
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scholars have sought to determine ―whether a network appears to be performing at a level 
that justifies continued public support‖ (Provan & Milward, 2001).  
One effort to measure network performance was the five criteria proposed by 
Gray (2000). She suggested 1) goal achievement, 2) increased social capital, 3) shared 
meaning, 4) increased interaction among network members and 5) more equitable power 
allocation. Her first concentrates goal alignment. However, in network settings it is 
important to consider network members‘ diverging interests, their interactions and the 
difficulty of measuring shifting objectives (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). In this sense, the 
traditional top-down approach to organizational performance, focusing on goal 
achievement, is not well attuned to network performance because the goal achievement 
method does not center on the interaction process but on the initial problem of one actor 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Provan & Milward, 1995). Thus, the literature on network 
management suggests ex post satisfying criteria instead of the ex ante approach as an 
evaluation criteria (Teisman, 1992, 1995; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Bingham and 
colleagues (2003) further argued that, to determine the success or failure of collaboration, 
we should understand if the most important indicators show the same direction over time 
and across different contexts.  
In networks, actors are likely to have different perceptions of a problem or 
objective in the early stages of a process. For example, network members from the 
private sector may not relate well to the public objectives sought (Gray, 2000). However, 
through interaction processes they can accommodate their opinion on the issue and arrive 
at collective decision making. Therefore, for network performance evaluation, the 
literature has emphasized individual actors‘ subjective judgments on the policy-making 
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process because the views of network actors reflect process elements such as learning 
behaviors. Chen‘s (2008) network effectiveness definition, ―a perception among program 
staff that their collaborative efforts are achieving…‖ is consistent with this argument. In 
their book, Alter and Hage (1993) also suggested to measure network members‘ 
perceptions for assessing the effectiveness of inter-organizational networks.  
Milward and Provan (2000) suggested that network evaluation can be viewed 
from the perspectives of at least four different parties: 1) individual clients and advocacy 
groups, 2) agency managers and network administrators, 3) local officials and community 
leaders and 4) funders and regulators. Provan and Milward (2001) developed a rationale 
for evaluating publicly funded, community-based inter-organizational networks. They 
argued that network evaluation should be considered at all three levels of participation: 
community, network and organization/participation levels.  
Research Framework  
In summary, this dissertation examines existing but largely separate theories 
concerning the affect of network member diversity on network performance. Specifically, 
this research explores the impact of network member diversity on performance through 
social capital variables (i.e., internal density and external range) and network 
management. Based on a review of current theories, I proposed several hypotheses 
corresponding to the following model. Figure 3 posits a research framework for the 
present research.  
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Figure 3. Proposed Model 
 
 
 
This proposed model was tested using MPOs in the United States. Chapter 3 
further discusses the empirical context: the history of MPOs as well as MPO structures 
and processes. Research findings are addressed in the following chapters.  
  
Network 
member 
diversity 
Network  
performance  
Internal 
density  
External 
range 
Network 
management 
 42 
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT  
 ―The metropolitan area is the best empirical referent for the development 
of theory having to do with changes underway in public 
administration…In the high fragmentation of the American metropolis one 
can find most of the disarticulated state – the declining salience of 
jurisdiction, the fuzziness of borders, a growing asymmetry in the 
relationship between the governed and those who govern, and an erosion 
of the capacity of the jurisdiction to contain and, thereby, manage complex 
social, economic, and political issues‖ (Frederickson, 1999, p.707). 
Metropolitan areas have emerged as the prevalent economic and social units (Katz, 
2000). They have grown rapidly with the spread of population around central cities, but 
they have also brought environmental and other problems that cannot be easily solved by 
existing governmental structures that reflect current jurisdictional lines. The policy sector 
on which this dissertation focuses is transportation, where collaboration plays a central 
role in solving complex problems. State and local governments face various 
transportation issues that directly affect citizens‘ lives. The U.S. federal government 
insists on regional transportation planning because U.S. roads and other transportation 
facilities cross and connect many communities. Traffic congestion in one area can lead to 
congestion in other areas (Genesee Transportation Council, 2010). 
  
 43 
Figure 4. Federal Funds Apportioned for Metropolitan Transportation Planning,  
FY 2000-FY 2009 ($ Millions) 
  
*Source: Mallett (2010, p. 5)  
 
The federal funds apportioned to metropolitan transportation planning have 
increased over time. In FY 2009, almost $400 million in federal transit and highway 
funds were distributed (Mallett, 2010). To ensure that taxes are spent wisely, regional 
outlook and collaborative approaches are perceived as innovative ways to address these 
transportation challenges by helping individuals with diverse perspectives work together, 
resulting in more sustainable transportation solutions (National Policy Consensus Center, 
2003). 
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Table 3. Evolution of the Metropolitan Planning Between 1980 and 2020 
 From 1980 to 2000 From 2000 to 2020 
Emphasis 
Areas 
Methods and data in support 
of capital programming 
Improved information on a wide-
ranging set of impacts for a variety of 
capital, operational, pricing, lifestyle 
and land use decisions 
Efficiency  Highway networks and 
corresponding level of service 
(speed and travel time) 
Multimodal system operation and 
broader performance measurement 
(accessibility and mobility) 
Perspective How to get from point ‗A‘ to 
‗B‘ 
Broader context of transportation role 
in community, and global, national, 
state and regional economic markets 
Focus Vehicle, passenger, or person 
movements 
Broader viewpoint, including goods 
movement and productivity changes, 
as well as land use impacts 
Technology Vehicle and system 
technology viewed as a given 
Innovative technologies used to 
influence system operation and 
substitute for travel  
Land use Acceptance of land use 
patterns as a given and not 
part of the solution set 
Use of growth management and 
―smart growth‖ tools in connection 
with transportation policies as a major 
strategy  
Environmental 
impacts 
Seen as a project-level 
mitigation issue 
Linkage between transportation 
decisions and a broader systems and 
sustainability framework 
Plan 
evaluation and 
equity 
Often defined by modal 
choices made by 
policymakers; political 
boundaries; aggregate user 
benefits and costs 
Equitable distribution of benefits and 
costs within the concept of 
community; equity consideration  
Approach  What can the MPO do to 
―solve‖ the transportation 
problem? 
What can all of us do together (e.g., 
partnerships) to improve 
transportation? 
Public 
participation 
Narrowly defined 
interest/advocacy groups with 
specific objectives 
More broadly defined groups with 
wider objectives; use of public 
opinion surveys and focused 
educational efforts 
*Source: Meyer (1999), cited in Rothblatt & Colman (2001) 
 
The history of metropolitan transportation planning in the United States supports 
the need for the collaborative approach (Table 3). Surprisingly, however, scant research 
has been conducted on collaboration in the field of public administration focusing on the 
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transportation policy area, though some studies have tackled the transportation policy 
from the perspective of strategic planning and management (Bryson et al., 2009; Poister 
& Van Slyke, 2002). To fill this gap, this dissertation focuses on collaborative efforts in 
regional transportation planning, specifically MPOs in the United States. The MPO is an 
organization that collaboratively decides federal transportation fund investment within 
each metropolitan region. The role of an MPO is quite significant in that it develops a 
coordinated decision regarding the region‘s transportation needs.  
Much of the spatial planning literature discusses the need for collaboration among 
different actors, such as municipal governments, transportation planners and state 
department of transportation (Scott et al., 2005). An MPO has been considered as one of 
the actors in such transportation planning networks, but insufficient attention has been 
paid to the MPO itself as a unit of analysis. Although some studies have raised concerns 
about the possibility that equity in MPO policy boards might lead to a transportation 
investment bias (e.g., Lewis, 1998; Nelson et al., 2004), the MPO has mainly been 
discussed regarding its history and role change as a planning actor by new legislations 
(e.g., McDowell, 1999).  
Moreover, the MPO provides a good opportunity to study inter-organizational 
networks at the network level because it can easily specify the network boundary in terms 
of MPO board membership, despite the fact network boundary specification is often 
mentioned as an obstacle in network research. MPOs also provide useful empirical 
settings for a quantitative approach on collaboration, which has been extremely rare in 
previous literature (Thomson, 2008), because the basic components of MPOs are similar 
across states and exist throughout the country.  
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Although the MPO is called an ―organization,‖ it can more accurately be 
considered as a formalized inter-organizational network. The National Association of 
Regional Councils (NARC) identifies a MPO as ―a network of experienced professionals 
dedicated to solving problems the regional way‖ (National Association of Regional 
Council, 2011). To follow the definition given by Agranoff (2007), PMNs are 
―collaborative structures that bring together representatives from public agencies‖ (p.3). 
The characteristics of the MPO (discussed below) meet the definition of a PMN. In his 
book, Agranoff (2007) took a MPO as an example of PMNs. 
To put the MPO in context, it is important to understand the history of MPOs and 
the structures and processes of MPOs in regional transportation planning. Before my 
empirical data and method are presented in Chapter 4, this chapter provides a brief 
introduction to the MPO as the empirical setting of the research. 
3.1 History of MPOs 
The purposes of MPOs are set forth in 23 U.S.C. 104(f), 134; the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part VI, voL.48, Part 450, subpart C; and other relevant federal and state 
laws and rules. Their responsibilities include:  
―…cooperatively carrying out transportation planning; coordinating the formal 
actions of government bodies at the local, regional, state and federal levels for the 
implementation of transportation policies, plans and programs; development and 
adoption of a regional plan for transportation improvements; and the biannual 
development of a multi-year program of projects to be funded with available 
federal assistance in accordance with that plan‖ (by-laws of GTC, p.1).  
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962 included the federal requirement for 
transportation planning in urban areas, which encouraged ―continuing comprehensive 
transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by states and local communities‖ 
(P.L.87-866), but the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 formally established MPOs for 
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metropolitan areas with populations greater than 50,000 (Mallett, 2010). MPOs have been 
designated to perform the federally mandated ―three-C‖ (i.e., continuing, cooperative and 
coordinated) planning process to determine the local use of federal transportation funds. 
The local government officials participating in this planning process must consider the 
region‘s overall transportation needs. In practice, however, state officials often have 
dominated decision making in transportation planning and thus, MPOs have remained in 
a relatively weak position (Goldman & Deakin, 2000).  
However, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) 
substantially strengthened the role of MPOs and their power over fund allocations. Goetz 
and colleagues (2002) summarized this change: ―Beginning in 1991, MPOs were 
transformed from advisory institutions into institutions that directly influence the 
distribution of money – from voluntary planning organizations to organizations that have 
their fingers on some of the purse strings‖ (Goetz, Dempsey & Larson, 2002, p. 90).  
A report by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1995) 
indicated that ISTEA significantly broadened the responsibilities of MPOs in three 
fundamental ways: 
 The MPO organization must be more inclusive and linked more strongly with 
other organizations and the public.  
 The MPO planning process must be considerably broader in scope, fully inter-
modal, more advanced technologically, more outcome oriented, and more open to 
interaction with decision makers and affected parties.  
 A new implementation role is established for MPOs that are designated as 
Transportation Management Areas. These MPOs (about 137 of them, mostly with 
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populations over 200,000) will determine how to spend about 20 percent of 
ISTEA funds, making them more responsible for making planning results. They 
must be federally certified every three years (p. iii). 
ISTEA added new activities to the functions of MPOs. It ―broadens the content of 
transportation planning, considers environmental factors more thoroughly, including 
additional stakeholders, and allocates a portion of the federal-aid funds through regional 
planning rather than by state decision making‖ (Gage & McDowell, 1995, p. 133). Under 
ISTEA, the fiscal and planning authority that autonomous transit agencies and the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) formerly held was passed to an MPO consisting 
mostly of local government leaders (Boschken, 1998). MPO funding was increased to 1% 
of the funding for the five core federal aid highway programs–the National Highway 
System (NHS), Surface Transportation Program (STP), Congestion Mitigation and Air 
Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ), Interstate Maintenance Program and the Bridge 
Program (Hall, 2006). The fiscal constraint provisions required MPOs to cooperate with 
the state and other transit agencies and develop fiscally feasible short-range 
Transportation Improvement Plans (TIPs) and long-range Transportation Plans (LRTP). 
Those plans include specific funding sources for all projects. In addition, the act required 
more citizen involvement as well as the criteria for reviewing transportation programs 
(Sanchez & Wolf, 1995). As a result, MPOs became more involved in regional 
transportation planning and now have more interaction with state DOTs and local 
governments.  
ISTEA was reenacted by two subsequent acts: the Transportation Equity Act for 
the 21
st
 century of 1998 and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
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Equity Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005. They reaffirmed ISTEA with some 
modifications, but no substantive changes were made to the role and responsibilities of 
MPOs or the level of funding they receive (Wolf & Farquahr, 2005).  
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3.2 MPO Structures and Processes  
Although organizational structure and staff arrangements may vary depending on 
the agreement between state and local officials (Government Accountability Office, 2009; 
Mallett, 2010), MPOs typically have four basic components (see Figure 3): (1) a policy-
making board (2) a technical advisory board, (3) a citizen‘s advisory board and (4) a 
MPO staffing arrangement (Advisory Commission Intergovernmental Relations, 1995). 
First, as a decision-making body, the policy board makes final decisions on funding 
allocation on regional transportation projects. The core membership of an MPO is 
described by federal law, and sometimes state law. The members include local elected or 
appointed officials, state government officials and other representatives from 
organizations such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA).  
Transportation planning often requires complex technical knowledge on specific 
issues (e.g., Geographic Information System). Thus, the technical advisory board is 
charged with technical oversight of the MPO‘s work. The board is a working group 
composed of professional staff representatives of the organizations participating in the 
MPO. The board members regularly meet, review, and approve technical and planning 
reports. They also provide recommendations to the policy board members.  
The citizen advisory board devotes their time to the task that informs the public of 
the MPO‘s programs and activities and encourages interested citizens to participate in 
them (DARTS, 2010). The MPO has been given the responsibility to involve the public 
through expanded citizen participation efforts. Finally, a staffing arrangement helps to 
maintain the process and carry out the required plans and programs.  
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Figure 5. Typical MPO Structure 
 
 *Source: Plumeau (2004, p. 21) 
 
As of June 2011, 384 MPOs existed nationwide
2
 in areas with populations over 
50,000. To qualify and receive federal transportation funds, MPOs must meet the 
following basic requirements (Government Accountability Office, 2009). 
 LRTPs (20 years): MPOs are responsible for carrying out federally mandated 
long-range transportation investment plans. 
 Short-range (4 years) TIPs: MPOs develop the multiyear listings of transportation 
projects with priorities.  
 Unified Planning Work Program (UPWP) annually describes transportation 
planning activities to be undertaken by the MPO. It is prepared by MPO 
professional staff in cooperation with member agencies. The purpose of the 
                                                             
2 I obtained information on the total number of MPOs from www.planning.dot.gov/mpo.asp. 
[Data accessed in June 2011 at www. planning.dot.gov/mpo.asp.] 
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UPWP is to provide an overview of regional planning activities, funding sources 
for each planning project, and anticipated work products.  
 Public Participation Plan (PPP): The SAFETEA-LU authorized in 2005 
emphasized citizen participation by requiring MPO to release a PPP. This plan is 
intended to ensure broad public participation during the development of regional 
transportation planning. PPP is compliant with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which demonstrates ―no person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance‖ (42 U.S.C. Section 2000d). 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter provides an overview of my sources of data as well as my research 
methods and procedure used in this empirical research. The first section discusses two 
sources of data: 1) a Web-based survey of the MPO policy board members and directors 
and 2) policy board meeting minutes. The second section includes measures, followed by 
descriptive statistics.  
4.1 Survey Procedure and Instrument  
Survey Procedure  
To test my hypotheses, I relied primarily on survey data collected from MPOs. 
This section explains the survey sample and procedure. As noted in the previous section, 
each committee consists of representatives from different organizations such as local 
governments, regional transit agencies, and State Department of Transportation. The 
intended survey respondents were policy board members and directors in MPOs.  
For data collection, I first obtained contact information for MPO directors from 
the U.S. Department of Transportation website (www.planning.dot.gov) and contacted 
110 MPOs directors in the eastern region of the United States through direct email appeal, 
along with a brief description of this research. Once I obtained approval from the MPO 
executive director (or planning manager), I sent him or her two separate invitations 
containing Web survey links for both the director and policy board members so the 
director could forward the surveys to the board members. The survey took 10-15 minutes 
to complete, ensured confidentiality and included a concise explanation of the study.  
Because this research focuses on the characteristics of the network (i.e., MPO) as 
a whole, data were collected from multiple network members (―informants‖) within each 
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network who could provide valid and reliable information about collaborative decision 
making. This was expected to help avoid mono-method bias. To increase the response 
rate, two follow-up reminders were sent to those directors and board members who had 
not completed the survey. The reminders for policy board members were sent through 
MPO directors. Unlike the survey methodology used in most prior studies that focused on 
ego networks, this research solicited responses from every committee member and 
director of each MPO. This approach made it possible to analyze diverse views on 
collaborative decision making even within the same MPO. 
The survey distribution began in June 2011 and continued over multiple waves to 
its completion in October 2011. The survey was administered using the Syracuse 
University Maxwell School Web survey program tool (https://survey.maxwell.syr.edu). 
Of the 384 MPOs in the United States, I contacted 110 MPOs in the eastern region as a 
sample. Of these 110 MPOs, 34 participated in the survey (i.e., at least one person 
responded from each). Data were collected from 61 policy committee members and 33 
directors in a total of 34 MPOs. The response rate for MPO directors was 30% (33/110), 
and the average response rate for policy board members was approximately 20%, ranging 
from 4.4 to 38.9 %. Although this response rate is relatively low, the fact that most policy 
board members were politicians and top-level local government officials should be taken 
into account. Researchers who approach top managers as respondents tend to obtain 
lower response rates than other researchers who study non-executive-level individuals 
(Baruch & Holtom, 2008). Simply put, top-level officials have less time and energy to 
complete surveys (Cooper & Payne, 1988).  
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Sample Characteristics  
The sample included a total of 34 MPOs from 11 states in the eastern United 
States. Table 4 describes MPO survey participation by population.  
Table 4.  Survey Participation by MPO Population Classification 
Population classification Survey sample Total MPOs  
Large population
a
  11% (4) 13% (50) 
Medium population
b
  38% (13) 39% (149) 
Small population
c
 50% (17) 48% (185) 
Total 100% (34) 100% (384) 
Note: The population category is based on GAO (2009). 
a. Population of 1million and above 
b.Population of 200,000 – 999,999 
c. Population of 50,000 – 199,999 
 
Because the sample was not drawn by random or stratified sampling, two 
selection bias analyses were conducted at the network (i.e., MPO) level. If the sample is 
not representative, drawing inference of the findings to the population may generate 
biased results and the external validity is diminished (Werner, Praxedes, & Kim, 2007). 
Because the data collection targeted mainly MPOs in the Eastern region of the United 
States (non-random), there remains the possibility of selection bias, which would arise if 
there are any systematic and unobservable differences in the characteristics between 
those selected and those not selected (O'Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 2003). Non-response 
bias also needs to be considered because the response rate is relatively low. Therefore, 
this section addresses non-response bias analysis to test the representativeness of the 
sample used in this dissertation.  
Non-response bias can be tested by comparing characteristics of respondents who 
completed surveys with those of non-respondents who did not complete the surveys.  
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Drawing inference about the population from a sample with non-response may generate 
biased results. To examine such concerns, I ran two types of t-test analyses: (1) final 
sample versus population; and (2) final sample versus the MPOs I contacted. I first 
examined the characteristics of sample and all MPOs for substantial differences. Second, 
I compared my sample with the MPOs I initially contacted. T-test analyses revealed there 
were no statistically significant differences for both cases, in terms of population size and 
area (sq. miles). In both cases, the two sets of MPOs are considerably similar. Tables 5 
and 6 show the results of t-tests.  
Table 5. Two-Sample T-tests: Population 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Total MPOs 384 636195.6 1498724 
Sample MPOs 34 522850.2 1004435 
Mean difference: p = 0.5505 
Contacted MPOs 110 599941.4 1403107 
Sample MPOs 34 522850.2 1004435 
Mean difference: p = 0.7247 
 
Table 6. Two-Sample T-tests: Area 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Total MPOs 384 1135.003 2417.411 
Sample MPOs 34 781.3235 786.2179 
Mean difference: p = 0.3968 
Contacted MPOs 110 850.5636 960.1486 
Sample MPOs 34 781.3235 786.2179 
Mean difference: p = 0.7027 
 
As previously noted, this study collected responses from 61 policy board 
members. Policy board respondents were 18% female and 82% male. Over 80% had a 
college degree, and about half (52.4%) had attended graduate school. The average age of 
the respondents was 56. In terms of ethnicity, Caucasians dominated policy boards 
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(90.16%) in my sample, and this showed a consistent pattern with the concern that MPO 
boards under represent racial minorities and over represent Caucasian constituents in the 
literature (Lewis, 1998; Sanchez, 2006). This phenomenon is related to the fact that most 
MPO boards adopt a one-seat-one-vote policy (Dempsey, Goetz, & Larson, 2000). It is 
not surprising that 85% of MPOs in my sample operate a non-weighted voting structure, 
while only four MPOs have a population-weighted voting structure. 
Table 7. Demographics of Survey Sample: Policy Board Member Sample (N = 61) 
Category N (%) 
Gender  
 Male 50 (82%) 
 Female  11 (18%) 
Age   
 32-40 6 (9.84%) 
 41-50 11 (18.03%) 
 51-60 19 (31.15%) 
 61-70 22 (36.07%) 
 71+ 3 (4.92%) 
Education  
 High school 8(13.11%) 
 College 21(34.43%) 
 Masters 30(49.18%) 
 Doctoral 2(3.28%) 
Ethnicity   
 African-American 1(1.64%) 
 Caucasian 55(90.16%) 
 Hispanic 3(4.92%) 
 Native American 2(3.28%) 
 
Policy board members in my sample had an average tenure of 5.6 years in the 
MPO board and 12.3 years at their home organizations. Board members consist of voting 
and non-voting members. Non-voting members are entitled to join in the policy board 
meetings. Many MPOs assigned non-voting membership to representatives from state 
and federal government officials such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
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and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). In the sample, 77% of members were 
voting members and 23% were non-voting. Regarding the roles in the MPO policy board, 
26% of respondents served as chair, vice-chair and secretary. On average, respondents 
spend 10% of their work time doing MPO related activities outside of their home 
organizations. 
Survey Instrument  
Two types of web survey instruments were used for data collection. The initial 
questionnaire was designed after a careful review of the diversity, collaboration, network 
and regionalism literature relevant to this research. Some questions were drawn from 
questions used in previous studies to ensure construct validity. To check that the items 
were clear, the survey was pilot tested on three MPO directors and transportation 
planners. They made several useful comments that helped to develop the final version of 
the survey questionnaire. The survey items were slightly modified to reflect the unique 
aspect of the MPO. For example, wording such as ―policy board‖ were changed to 
―coordinating committee.‖  
The following section briefly describes the surveys for MPO directors and policy 
committee members. However, the detailed measures are discussed in the ―Measures‖ 
section below and a copy of the questionnaire used for the survey is provided in the 
Appendix.  
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Policy board member survey  
The survey consisted of five sections. The first section of the questionnaire 
elicited general network member characteristics, including voting/non-voting member, 
tenure with MPO committee and home organization. The second section of the survey 
contained values (individualism-collectivism) and network behavior questions. The third 
dealt with the respondents‘ interactions with other committee members on transportation 
topics. Respondents were also asked to indicate their interactions with listed 
organizations outside the MPO table on transportation topics. The fourth section asked 
their views on collaborative decision-making performance, and the final part included 
demographic information, including gender, age, race and level of education. 
For network data collection, a combination of sociometric roster and egocentric 
techniques was used (Wasserman & Faust 1994, p.45-50). Respondents were provided 
with a sociometric roster of all policy board members in their MPO. When collecting 
network data, the sociometric roster is preferred because it has proved to be reliable in 
―allowing individuals to report their recurring social interactions‖ (Marsden, 1990). 
However, if total policy board members exceed 50, a name generator question (up to 10 
people) was used with a list of policy board members in the MPO to reduce excessive 
burdens and ambiguity about members‘ identity
3
.  
  
                                                             
3
 I decided not to use the collected network data from my web-survey because I received a low 
response from policy board members in some MPOs. Because network data is especially sensitive 
to missing values, I alternatively used policy board meeting minutes to measure network 
relationships among network members. Also, MPO policy board members‘ gender and 
organizational membership were identified by archival sources to avoid potential bias resulting 
from low response rate.  
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Director survey 
The questionnaire for directors consists of (1) general characteristics of the MPO 
such as the type of structures and planning area boundary, (2) policy board members‘ 
characteristics and their network behaviors, (3) collaborative decision-making process 
including the way in which consensus is made and the main criteria to choose among 
different projects, and (4) perceived effectiveness and fairness on the MPO collaborative 
decision-making process and a list of methods the MPO uses to involve the public.  
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4.2 Meeting Minutes  
The term ―affiliation‖ in social network analysis means the participation data on 
which actors have participated in which events (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). The 
assumption is that co-presence in events indicates an underlying social tie. For instance, 
if people attend the same events more often, they are more likely to interact with each 
other and develop some type of relationship. Collecting affiliation data is especially 
useful to study people who are not easily accessible (for example, elites or celebrities) 
because the data can be obtained by archival sources, such as newspapers, government 
records and minutes of executive meetings without direct contacts.  
Because MPO members consist of high level government officials, I analyzed 
MPO meeting minutes over the past 12 months from the point the surveys were 
completed to assess social proximity among MPO members. The meeting minutes 
contain the list of board members (and alternatives) present in each meeting. Using this 
information, I recorded the list of board meetings attended by policy board members (and 
alternatives). The data were set up as a policy board member-by-meeting matrix X in 
which xij=1 if the ith member attended the jth meeting, and xij=0 otherwise. Table 8 
presents the data matrix for an MPO in North Carolina as an example. Given matrix X, I 
constructed XX, where ijth cell gives the number of meetings that both board member i 
and j attended. This value is interpreted as an index of the strength of social proximity of 
the two board members. Regarding the meaning of social proximity, Borgatti and Everett 
(1997, p. 246) explain:  
―What this index of social proximity means exactly is not always clear. In some 
cases we would be willing to assume that strong proximity reflects a positive 
affective tie. In other cases, we would recognize that certain pairs of highly 
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proximate member might not like each other at all (e.g., have a competitive 
relationship), but are still closely familiar with and influenced by each other. In 
still other cases, we would recognize the possibility that two board members could 
co-attend a series of the same (large) meetings and not ever have even met each 
other, in which case we might regard the large value of XX‘ij as an index of the 
potential for some kind of tie to develop between a pair. In all of these cases, XX‘ 
is regarded as representing the valued graph of a social network, which could not 
be measured directly and was instead constructed from an intermediate data set X.‖ 
Table 8. Actor-by-Meeting Matrix 
 
There is conventional wisdom that ―network analysis is intolerant of missing data‖ 
and concern that ―network measures become increasingly unreliable‖ if complete 
population data are not collected (Borgatti, Carley & Krackhardt, 2006; Costenbader & 
Valente, 2003). For this reason, researchers prefer collecting data from all members in a 
network, but their attempts have often been hampered by the costs of data collection. It is 
burdensome for researchers to collect full network data from all network members in 
multiple networks and response rates tend to decrease. This is an important difficulty 
when researchers conduct network research in a quantitative way (Provan, Huang & 
Milward, 2009). Network analyses with incomplete data are common in practice (Stork & 
Richards. 1992). It is assumed there is no foolproof solution to the missing data problem 
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in network analysis (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Robins et al., 2004). However, in the 
literature, very little discussion has been found to evaluate under what conditions network 
data including missing values could be accurate to measure network properties (Borgatti 
et al., 2006). Therefore, to measure the ties among all the actors in the MPO, this research 
constructed network data from archival records. This is one commonly used methods in 
the network literature (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
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4.3 Measures  
As previously mentioned, the primary data in this research consists of survey 
responses from MPO directors and policy board members. Most survey questions were 
drawn from previous studies to ensure the validity and reliability of the measures. The 
measures presented in this section focus on those employed for seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SURE) in Chapter 5. Other measures for additional analyses are included in 
each of the analysis sections.  
Diversity  
This research uses gender as surface-level diversity because it has been the 
primary focus of diversity research. Organizational membership is also employed as a 
proxy variable for cultural diversity, which is deep-level diversity. There are three 
popular approaches used to measure diversity–the coefficient of variation, the Blau index 
of heterogeneity and the entropy index. The coefficient of variation is appropriate for 
continuous variables such as age, while the Blau‘s and Teachman‘s index are widely used 
for categorical variables such as gender and race (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Choi & 
Rainey, 2010). As noted in various reviews of the literature, one of the reasons for 
inconsistent findings of group diversity research is perhaps a methodological issue. In 
much group diversity literature, a diversity score representing the group is calculated 
from attribute information in their employee survey data that usually include non-
responses (i.e., missing data). A fundamental assumption of diversity measures is that 
they are on the basis of complete attribute data; hence, diversity scores based on 
incomplete attribute data may distort the impact of diversity on the outcome (Allen, 
Stanley, Williams & Ross, 2007). Let‘s assume that an MPO‘s board members consist of 
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80% men and 20%women. If most women board members in the MPO did not respond to 
the survey, the MPO‘s gender diversity score will be close to zero. Therefore, in this 
analysis, two types of diversity (i.e., gender and organizational membership) were used to 
test my theoretical model because gender and organizational membership of all group 
members were identified from documents and other sources.  
Gender and organizational membership diversity 
All MPO policy board members‘ gender and organizational membership were 
identified by archival sources. Because gender and organizational membership diversity 
are categorical variables, they both can be measured with Teachman‘s (1980) index of 
diversity. This index considers how work group members are distributed across the 
possible categories of a variable (Pelled et al., 1999).  
             
 
   
 
where Pi is the proportion of MPO members in the ith category. The higher the 
Teachman‘s index value, the greater the distribution of characteristics within the group.  
Blau‘s index of heterogeneity was also used as an alternative measure. The Blau 
index is calculated by the formula: 1-∑pi
2
, where p is the proportion of MPO members in 
a given category and i is the number of different categories (Blau, 1977). The ranges vary 
from 0 (indicating all MPO members belong to the same category) to 1(indicating that all 
MPO members belong to different categories).  
Network Measures  
All network measures were calculated using UCINET 6 software (Borgartti et al., 
2002).  
Network density  
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Density is defined as the sum of the ties divided by the number of possible ties. It 
measures the average degree to which all members are connected to other members. For 
valued data, it is the ratio of all total values (tie strength) that are actually present to the 
number of possible ties. Network density is measured as the average level of connection 
between any two members in the MPO (Uzzi, 1996). 
Density
 
 
                 
  
   
  
   
          
     , where Zijk is the degree of connection between 
member i and j of network (MPO)k and N is the number of policy board members in 
MPOk. In the denominator,          was divided by 2 because the network data I used 
did not include directions among ties. As an alternative measure of valued data, I 
calculated network density using binary data by converting all of the values greater than 1 
to 1. 
External range (Structural holes) 
According to Burt (1992), to obtain benefits in networks, the number of non-
redundant relationships is important. A structural hole exists when a contact is non-
redundant. As the basis for the external range (structural hole), I used a reverse of Burt‘s 
(1992, 2000) constraint measure because a low structural constraint indicates many 
structural holes. In technical terms, ERk =1-Ck. The range score for each MPO was 
calculated using the following formula: 
 Network constraint (Ck), where the constraint posed by j 
on ego (a focal individual) i and averaged over all network members. There are two 
components of constraints. The first component is the proportion of i‘s network time and 
energy invested in contact j. 
Ck = pij + piqpqj
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 ,where Zij is the strength of the relationship between i and j. The second 
component is the strength of the indirect connection between i and j through mutual 
contracts q. The external range varies from 0 to 1, with low values indicating the 
existence of few structural holes and high values indicating the existence of many. An 
external range with a high value indicates that the network actor spans many structural 
holes, while low values notes that the network actor participating in the MPO policy 
board is relatively well embedded by maintaining redundant connections.  
  
pij = zij / ziq
q=1
N
å
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Network Performance 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a paucity of research has endeavored to 
develop evaluation measures for network performance. One assessment approach is ―ex-
post satisfying‖ criterion, which measures subjective judgment of network actors (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2000). The present research measured the perceptions of MPO directors 
and policy board members on network performance in terms of effectiveness and fairness. 
The MPO directors and policy board members were asked to rate the MPO‘s overall 
effectiveness and fairness. The questions were as follows: ―Please rate the overall 
effectiveness of the MPO policy board as it relates to decision making‖ and ―Please rate 
the overall fairness of the MPO policy board as it relates to decision making.‖ Five-point 
Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (very ineffective) to 5 (very effective) and from 1(very 
unfair) to 5(fair) were used, respectively.  
Network Management  
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) offered a model to classify the behaviors of 
network participants into four categories of activation, framing, mobilizing and 
synthesizing (AFMS). Based on this framework, McGuire and Silvia (2009) created 34 
questions describing the behaviors of network members. Among the four types of 
network management, this research focuses on mobilizing and synthesizing behaviors 
because of the characteristics of MPOs (their membership is defined by law) and adapted 
ten questions for mobilizing and synthesizing behaviors from McGuire and Silvia‘s (2009) 
questionnaire. Respondents were asked: ―How often do you engage in the following 
behaviors in your metropolitan planning organization?‖ A 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often) was used. Cronbach‘s alpha was 0.766 for 
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mobilizing behavior and 0.885 for synthesizing behavior, respectively. It shows high 
reliability of both measures. 
Table 9. List of Mobilizing Behaviors ( = 0.766) 
 
Table 10. List of Synthesizing Behaviors ( = 0.885) 
 
Network Size   
MPO size was measured as the number of members in the MPO policy board. The 
MPOs vary in terms of size, ranging from seven members to eighty members. Because 
density and external range variables are sensitive—generally negative—to network size, 
it is important to include size as a control in my analysis.  
Number of Meetings  
As another control variable, I considered the total number of policy board 
meetings in the past 12 months from the point when the survey was sent. Because most 
participants are politicians and government officials at the high level, they were expected 
to interact with each other through regular meetings.  
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics  
The survey data were collected from two types of respondents – director and 
policy board members, and the analyses presented in each section of Chapter 5 utilized 
different samples. This section provides descriptive statistics and correlations for 
variables, using the MPO director samples that are used for regression analyses as the 
main interest of analysis in Chapter 5.  
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Variables: Director Sample 
 
  
 71 
In my sample, the policy boards in the MPO ranged in size from 7 to 80. The 
mean for the gender diversity index
4
 was 0.317, medium level. On average, 19.4% of 
MPO policy board members in the sample were female. The minimum percentage of 
female was 4.35 %, and the maximum value was 40 %. The MPO policy board with the 
largest number of female was in Ithaca, New York. The mean for the organizational 
membership index was 0.845, high level. As dependent variables, I examine both 
perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness from MPO directors. The average of 
perceived MPO effectiveness is 4.455 (out of 5), indicating a high score, but it shows 
substantial variation across MPOs (s = .666). The mean of perceived MPO fairness is 
4.394 (out of 5) and it also shows considerable variation (s = .704). On average, MPO 
directors rated their policy board‘s decision-making effectiveness and fairness positively 
(scores ranged from 3 to 5). Given these results, it is important to know how their MPOs 
gauge overall effectiveness and fairness because that may reflect what the directors think 
about MPO‘s performance as well as the criteria the directors use to rate MPOs‘ 
performance in the survey (see Section 5.1, Chapter 5).  
Table 12 presents the correlation matrix for study variables. Several relationships 
are noteworthy. First, the correlation result shows the importance of network size as a 
covariate. That is, large MPO policy boards have significantly more meetings and more 
external range than do small MPO boards. Large MPOs also tend to include a great 
diversity of organizations participating in the MPO.  
Second, in a given empirical setting, density and external range were not 
significantly related with each other (-0.109), meaning no general positive or negative 
                                                             
4
 Gender and organizational diversity index were calculated here according to information from 
archival sources, such as the MPO‘s website and document, not from policy board member 
surveys.  
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relationship exists. The partial correlation, controlling for network size, was -0.099. This 
result is consistent with the literature such as Reagans and Zuckerman (2001, 2004), 
suggesting network density and external range are logically distinct. Third, correlation 
between gender diversity and internal density was non-significant. Correlation between 
network effectiveness and network fairness was 0.7391, suggesting strong relations of 
two assessments.  
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Table 12. Correlation matrix with main study variables  
 
 
N = 34 Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
*p<.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first reports the summary of survey 
findings on MPO governance and collaborative decision-making process. The second 
section provides preliminary analysis of the research model. The third tests an analytical 
model and hypotheses proposed in the previous chapters, using 34 MPOs at the MPO 
level.  
5.1 MPO Governance and Collaborative Decision-Making Process  
Although MPOs serve an important role in transportation planning in the regions, 
we know very little about how MPOs are governed and make collaborative decisions 
(Bond, Kramer & Seggerman, 2010). This section provides a discussion of the survey 
results regarding MPO governance structure and their collaborative decision-making 
process. There are few studies and reports dealing with MPO governance (e.g. Bond, 
Kramer & Seggerman, 2010; Dempsey, Goetz & Larson, 2000; Rothblatt & Colman, 
2001; Goode et al., 2001). Although most studies solicited responses from MPO directors, 
the present study asked both directors and every member of the MPO policy board to 
respond the survey.  
MPO Governance Structure
5
  
There are two broad administrative categories of MPOs: hosted and independent 
(Bond, Kramer & Seggerman, 2010). According to Bond and colleagues‘ (2010) 
definitions, a hosted MPO refers to the situation where ―another organization acts as the 
fiscal agent for the MPO and holds the power to hire and fire the MPO‘s employees‖ and 
                                                             
5
 MPO directors answered the questions regarding MPOs‘ administrative structure. These 
questions are mostly drawn from Bond et al.‘s (2010) report.  
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an independent MPO refers to when ―the MPO acts as its own fiscal agent and if the 
director can only be hired and fired by the MPO board‖ (Bond et al., 2010, p. 3-1). In my 
sample, nearly 80% of the MPOs operate from within another agency and a council of 
government is the most common type of hosting agency. Table 13 provides the 
proportion of hosted and independent MPOs by population category. Based on Chi-
square test, I found no statistical differences between them (p = 0.323).  
Figure 6. Percentage of Hosted and Independent MPOs 
 
Table 13. Hosted and Independent MPOs by Population (N, %) 
Population Hosted MPOs  Independent MPOs 
Large population
a
  14(54%) 3(43%) 
Medium population
b
  10(38%) 2(29%) 
Small population
c
 2(8%) 2(29%) 
Note: The population category is based on GAO (2009). 
d.Population of 1 million and above 
e. Population of 200,000 – 999,999 
f. Population of 50,000 – 199,999 
 
  
Hosted 
MPOs 
79% 
Indepen
dent 
MPOs 
21% 
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Table 14. Types of Host Agency 
 Types of Host Agencies Freq. (%) 
Council of Government 9 (34.6) 
County government 7 (26.9) 
Municipal government 6 (23.1) 
Modal authority 3 (11.5) 
Joint city/county government 1 (3.9) 
Table 15 shows the frequency of MPO policy board meetings. Because some 
documents MPOs are required to produce should be updated annually, MPO policy 
boards are expected to meet at least once a year (Bond, Kramer & Seggerman, 2010). The 
most common meeting frequency in the sample was bi-monthly and four MPOs reported 
―as needed‖ for this question.   
Table 15. Frequency of MPO Policy Board Meetings 
 Meeting frequency Freq. (%) 
Monthly 9 (27.3) 
Bi-monthly  10 (30.3) 
Quarterly 9 (27.3) 
Bi-annually 1 (3.0) 
Annually 0 
As needed 4 (12.1) 
 
Collaborative Decision Making in MPOs 
Consensus on policy decisions 
The majority of MPOs (76%) makes their major policy decisions (such as the 
Long-Range Planning or Transportation Improvement Program) by simple majority. 
Other MPOs reported that they use super majority or unanimous agreement. Four 
respondents reported ―Other,‖ and stated in narrative form. One of them reported that 
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they adopt simple majority for consensus, but they must have 2 of 3 state representatives 
from each state vote affirmatively for an action to pass.  
Project Selection Criteria  
Because MPOs are expected to allocate transportation funds to a limited number 
of projects, they conduct a project selection process for their TIP and LRTP. This process 
is essential for MPO decision making, but the criteria MPOs use to choose among 
different projects have not been examined sufficiently in the literature. In fact, 
prioritizing projects is very difficult because MPO boards consist of representatives from 
local jurisdictions who are under pressure to remain loyal to their constituents; on the 
other hand, though, they must consider regional benefits as well (Dempsey, Goetz & 
Larson, 2000). MPO directors and policy board members are asked to answer the 
following open-ended question: ―What are the main criteria used to choose among 
different projects?‖  
Selections are made in coordination with different project applicants seeking to 
maximize the benefit derived from limited funding resources. One MPO director 
described the project selection process as follows:  
 ―We have a call for projects process that helps build our TIP each year. Each 
MPO jurisdiction may submit project applications for either new projects or for 
additional funds for existing projects. Generally, we try to focus on funding and 
finishing existing projects before major new projects are added. It is rare that we 
have a set of projects from jurisdictions that are competing. We usually find a 
way to balance everyone's needs and have a unified set of projects to bring to the 
Policy Committee for final adoption by vote." 
 
Most respondents answered that they employ a combination of multiple criteria. Overall, 
the result showed that the decision making hinges primarily on fund availability, 
jurisdiction needs and regional benefits. Other criteria include safety improvement, 
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economic development, air quality and environment, traffic flow improvements and 
multi-modal connections. There were few differences between responses from directors 
and those from board members.  
When selecting projects, 21 MPOs (out of 34) in the sample utilize a ranking 
system (62%) to guide their decisions.
6
 They utilize different point systems for their 
ranking criteria. Some MPOs develop their point systems cooperatively with technical 
and policy board members; however, in some cases, state DOTs (e.g., Georgia, New 
York) lead a data-driven process that scores projects relative to each other. In particular, 
it seemed that TIP projects are chosen largely by state DOTs and the policy boards have 
little opportunity to select among different projects. Furthermore, most MPOs in the 
sample use weighted criteria. Although each project is evaluated and a score is generated, 
one respondent noted that the score is not to be used rigidly because a few points in either 
direction do not indicate a significant difference in rank but rather an overall level of 
regional importance. In this view, the selection process is subjective. 
Table 16. Examples of MPO Ranking System for Project Selection 
MPO  Content 
Montgomery MPO 
3 points for safety, traffic improvement, and regional significance 
1 point for any other identified benefit, for a maximum of 10 
points  
Hampton Roads 
MPO 
3-100 point scoring system by category of project such as project 
utility, economic vitality, and project viability 
 
Public involvement  
As noted in Chapter 4, MPOs are supposed to involve the public during their 
decision-making process. Figure 7 showed that MPOs use various methods for public 
                                                             
6
 Even MPOs that do not adopt a ranking system appear to use performance-based criteria for 
project selection (Montes de Oca & Levinson, 2006).  
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participation. Almost all MPOs in the sample (33 out of 34) have their MPO websites and 
use public information materials such as newsletters, brochures, advertisements and press 
releases.  
Figure 7. The Methods for Public Involvement (frequency) 
 
N = 33 MPOs 
 
In addition, MPO directors indicated to what extent each public involvement 
activity influences MPO decision making, with a five-point scale (1 = no extent; 3= 
moderate extent; and 5 = very great extent). Figure 8 presents the average scores across 
33 MPOs. Although only three MPOs use social media (i.e. Facebook), social media 
appeared as the most influential method to involve the public. As noted in Chapter 3, a 
citizen advisory board is typically included in a MPO‘s structure; but interestingly, its 
level of influence on MPO decision making was moderate. Rather, project workshops and 
interviews with key stakeholders/people are perceived as more effective public 
involvement tools than a citizen advisory board.  
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When asked if MPOs have specific evaluation criteria for public involvement 
activities, 52% of MPOs in the sample answered that they do. One respondent noted in a 
manner representative of more than 50 % of MPOs as follows: ―Each public involvement 
activity is qualitatively evaluated in terms of reach/participation, variety of participants, 
extent and variety of input received, satisfaction of participants in the activity and 
influence of input gathered on plans/decisions.‖ 
 
Figure 8. The Influence of Public Involvement Method on MPO Decision Making (mean) 
 
Evaluation of MPO decision-making process  
Despite the importance of having a method for measuring MPO performance, one 
has not been actively developed. Although the studies in the field of planning have 
widely discussed a possible performance measurement for regional transportation, 
research in the context of MPOs is relatively rare (Pickrell & Neumann, 2001; Cambridge 
Systematics, 2010). GAO (2009) reported the problem arising from the lack of MPO 
performance measures and recommended that MPOs adopt a performance measurement 
1 
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system. Hence, it is important to examine how MPOs evaluate their decision-making 
processes from their own perspectives.  
This section is based on the responses of MPO directors and policy board 
members to two open-ended questions: ―How does your MPO gauge the overall 
effectiveness of the MPO decision-making process?‖ and ―How does your MPO gauge 
the overall fairness of the MPO decision-making process?‖ Regarding the question of 
effectiveness, 29% (i.e., 10 out of 34 MPOs) responded that there are no methods to 
evaluate their effectiveness. Furthermore, 32% of MPO directors (i.e., 11 out of 34 MPOs) 
answered that the effectiveness is based primarily on whether the funds are programmed 
and spent in a timely manner. Because funding is limited, board members feel pressure to 
implement an approved project; therefore, whether or not projects move from phase to 
phase and through to completion gauge the effectiveness of the MPO decision-making 
process. Eight MPOs measure effectiveness by using feedback from the public and the 
general satisfaction of its member jurisdictions regarding how well the process works.  
With respect to fairness, almost half of the MPO directors in the sample indicated 
there are no specific measures for fairness. One respondent put it this way: 
―We don't have any formal measures to gauge fairness. I think this one is really in 
the eye of the beholder. On controversial issues, the determination of fairness may 
hinge on whether you got the result you wanted. I guess I look at it as making sure 
that the committees use a transparent, predictable process with ample public 
involvement to ensure that all voices have been heard. Then the vote on a 
particular issue should be considered fair regardless of the outcome.‖  
 
The other responses include the amount of complaints and feedback received from the 
community and policy board members (e.g., the number of people who show up at their 
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meetings to complain). Only one respondent raised the issue of the geographic and 
relative population balance of projects in terms of fairness in the decision-making process. 
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5.2 Preliminary Analysis  
Before testing the hypotheses, this section provides the results of the preliminary 
analyses of the research framework (see Figure 3). Difference of means was used to 
examine first the relationship between network member diversity and social capital and 
second, that between social capital and network performance. 
Relationship Between Diversity and Social Capital  
To explore the relationship between network member diversity and social capital, 
t-tests were conducted. Based on the previous literature, the research framework in this 
dissertation would predict a negative relationship between diversity and internal density, 
but a positive one between diversity and external range. Based on a diversity index (Blau) 
ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (heterogeneous), expected directions are shown in 
Table 17, but only one difference was found to be statistically significant. The mean of 
external range at the low level of organizational membership diversity was 0.722 
compared with 0.833 at the high level of membership diversity. Organizational 
membership diversity is positively associated with external range at the 0.001 level of 
significance. When policy board members‘ home organizations are more diverse, then the 
policy board has more structural holes, meaning that board members have more non-
redundant ties.   
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Table 17. Comparison of Means for Low versus High Level of Diversity
7
 
 
Note: Although I conducted t-tests using a different density measure (based on binary 
network data), I did not include the results here because it showed a pattern consistent 
with the density measure from the valued network data.  
***Significant at 0.001 level 
Relationship Between Social Capital and Network Performance 
Difference tests were carried out to examine whether there were significant 
differences between high and low levels of social capital in network performance. 
Measuring network (i.e., MPO) performance, I used multiple measures – perceived 
network effectiveness, network fairness,
8
 fund allocation fairness and the quality of the 
decision-making process–from board member and director survey responses.  
Fund allocation fairness was measured with two questions (e.g., ―the criteria for 
fund allocations are fair‖) and the quality of the decision-making process was measured 
with three questions for policy board members (e.g., ―the distribution of transportation 
funds by the MPO is based on the transportation needs of the entire metropolitan area‖). 
These questions were drawn from Dempsey et al.‘s (2000) report to Congress, and 
responses were structured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). Cronbach‘s alpha was 0.9131 and 0.8627 for fund allocation fairness and process 
                                                             
7
 I divided my sample into two groups based on the median value of diversity (low level = below 
the median, high level = above median) 
8
 Because the measures of network effectiveness and fairness from the MPO director survey were 
already discussed in Chapter 4, I include the measures of fairness and the quality of decision 
making from the policy board member survey alone here.  
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quality, respectively, meaning there is a high level of internal reliability between two 
measures.  
Table 18. Comparison of Means for Low versus High Level of Social Capital
9
 
 
Note: Although I conducted t-tests using different density measures (based on binary 
network data), I didn‘t include the results here because it showed a consistent pattern 
with the density measures from valued network data in Table 18.  
*Significant at .10 level, **Significant at .05 level, ***Significant at .01 level 
When I employed two network performance measures (i.e., perceived 
effectiveness and fairness) from MPO directors‘ responses, the differences in social 
capital variables were not significant. This result suggests that the differences were too 
small to produce significant results in my small sample. With regard to MPO 
performance based on policy board members‘ responses, there are statistically significant 
differences between low and high levels of social capital variables, but contrary to the 
expectation, there were negative relationships between social capital variables (i.e., 
density and external range) and network performance. This may be because of the 
                                                             
9
 The sample was divided into low and high level based on the median value of social capital. 
 
 
86 
possible non-response bias of policy boards. As noted in Chapter 4, the response rate of 
policy board members across MPOs ranged from 4.4 to 38.9%. To avoid this possible 
bias, network performance rated by MPO directors was used for subsequent regression 
analyses.  
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5.3 Regression Analysis  
Although this study collected survey data from 94 individuals, the sample size for 
the purpose of analysis is 34 MPOs because the unit of analysis is an MPO. This study 
used multiple sources of data to avoid inflated correlations because of mono-method bias. 
For example, MPO directors rated network management behavior and network 
performance. Archival sources were used to find diversity measures. Network-based 
social capital variables were based on the policy board meeting minutes. In the following 
sections, I ran two types of regression analyses to test my hypotheses.  
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Analysis 
First, I used the OLS to estimate a system of simultaneous equations by 
estimating each equation separately. Small sample size in this research may provide 
limited information to estimate all the equations in a system simultaneously and may 
result in biased estimates. Kennedy (2008) notes that, with acknowledging its asymptotic 
bias, the OLS estimator can be used in small samples because:  
―(1) The OLS has minimum variance among alternative estimators, (2) the 
properties of the OLS are less sensitive than the alternatives to the presence of 
estimation problems including multicollinearity, errors in variables, or 
misspecifications, particularly in small samples, (3) Predictions from 
simultaneous equation models estimated by OLS often compare quite favorably 
with predictions from the same models estimated by alternatives, and (4) OLS can 
be useful as a preliminary or exploratory estimator‖ (p.177). 
 
I examined the residuals to check whether they were normally distributed. 
Although there were no severe outliers in the models, the Shapiro-Wilk tests rejected the 
normality assumption for models 1, 4, and 5. This may affect the results of statistical 
significance tests because it changed the standard of error. Thus, the results should be 
interpreted with caution.  
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Table 19. Regression Analyses Predicting Social Capital and Network Performance 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01) 
 
Table 19 reports the OLS results. All models contain two control variables (i.e. 
network size and number of meetings). I estimated Models 5 and 6 in Table 19 with 
added interaction terms between social capital variables and network management 
variables. Gender diversity had no significant effect on density and performance 
measures. Organizational membership showed expected directions on each dependent 
variable. As expected, it had a negative influence on internal density. If the policy board 
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consists of members from diverse home organizations, these members will tend to have 
less communication or interaction with each other. Organizational membership diversity 
had a positive relationship with range, and this relationship was found to be statistically 
significant. Also, this study found that when a policy board has members who are diverse 
in terms of their home organizations, the board is more likely to have more structural 
holes. This implies that diverse members would have different contacts, and those 
contacts would be more likely to be disconnected from each other. Organizational 
membership diversity was also found to be positively associated with both measures of 
network performance, but it showed a statistically significant effect only on network 
fairness.  
Regarding network management behavior, synthesizing network management 
behavior had a significant and positive effect on both types of network performance. 
Mobilizing behavior showed negative relationships with network effectiveness and 
fairness, but they were not statistically significant. Four interaction terms showed 
consistent direction across Models 5 and 6, but only one interaction term between range 
(structural holes) and synthesizing behavior was significant.  
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Analysis    
Tables 20 shows the results of the models tesing Hypotheses 1 through 7. In 
estimating the models, I used SURE, originally proposed by Arnold Zeller (1962), to 
improve efficiency.
10
 SURE estimates several equations as a set, using a single regression 
and is appropriate ―when a series of regression analyses is conducted and the dependent 
variable in one regression becomes an independent variable in subsequent analyses 
                                                             
10
 Because of the sample size, I did not use a LISREL as an alternative method. 
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because it allows for error covariances among the residuals‖ (Johnston, 1984, cited in 
Brown, Jones & Leigh, 2005, p. 975)
11
. Thus, it is appropriate to use SUREs in this 
research because the predictors for internal density ovelap with the predictors for external 
range. In addition, internal density and external range are dependent variables in the 
equations, but they also become independent variables in the equation with network 
performance as a dependent variable.  
My research framework (Figure 3) consists of three types of relationships: 1) 
diversity and internal density 2) diversity and external range, and 3) social capital (i.e., 
density and range) and performance, but SURE includes four sets of multiple equations 
because I used two types of network performance (i.e., effectiveness and fairness) as 
dependent variables. That is, there are four equations representing           , where i 
refers to the ith equation. These equations can be written as the following matrix. 
 
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
   and    refer to internal density and external range, respectively, and    and    
represent a set of regressors explaining the variation of each dependent variable.    and 
   denote network performance, which was measured as effectiveness and fairness, 
respectively.    is a set of explanatory variables for network performance. If there is 
contemporaneous correlation between the error terms (for example,          ), the 
variance-covariance matrix of * is not diagonal. ―Estimating these error correlations and 
the diagonal elements should allow estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of * 
                                                             
11
 On the other hand, the program evaluation literature is concerned about the possibility of 
estimates being biased because of endogeneity issues when simultaneous equations are used in 
the SUR (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
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and generation of estimated generalized least square (GLS) estimates of *‖ (Kennedy, 
2008, p.187).  
To determine error independence and whether the variance–covariance is 
diagonal, I conducted a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, computed by using the 
chi-square distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The results show a statistically 
significant correlation between errors in equations at the 0.1 level of significance (chi-
square = 11.639, Pr = 0.071); thus, the residuals from the four equations are independent 
of one another and SURE produces efficiency gains. I used small sample adjustment 
option for analyses. I also checked potential collinearity effects with the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) because I found some significant correlations among several 
variables (e.g., network size and organizational membership diversity) (see Table 12), but 
the results indicated a limited effect of collinearity on models.  
Table 20 presents the results of the SURE. Each of equation (          , 
                      , and             is explained by one of the 
columns in Tables 20 and 21.  
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Table 20. Results of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models: Internal Density, External 
Range, and Network Performance Equations 
 
 
a. Teachman‘s (1980) index 
b. Entries are unstandardized coefficients  
c. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < .10, **p <. 05, ***p < .01  
The first equation explains the impact of network member diversity on internal 
density. In the previous literature, as a group (or network) gains more diverse members, 
internal density is expected to decrease, but two types of diversity had no signifciant 
relationships with internal density. Organizational membership diversity had negative 
relationships with density as expected, but it was not statistically significant. This 
equation tests Hypothesis 2, which predicted a negative association between network 
member diversity and internal density. Neither the relationship between gender diversity 
and internal density nor the relationship between organizational membership diversity 
and density was significant. Therefore, these results do not support Hypothesis 2.  
The second equation indicates the impact of diversity on external range. As 
expected, organizational membership diversity had a positive and significant impact on 
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range. This result means that as more diverse organizations participate in the MPO policy 
board, more structural holes appear and thus, the range of the network‘s external relations 
increase. However, gender diversity had nonsignificant associations with social capital 
variables in either direction. Thus, Hypothesis 3, predicting positive relationships 
between network member diversity and external range, was partially supported.  
Because the effect of gender diversity was nonsignificant, I conducted additional 
analyses to test the robustness of the result. I used an alternative measure of diversity–
Blau‘s index of heterogeneity–both for network effectiveness and fairness models (Table 
21). The result revealed no significant effect of gender diversity again and it showed a 
similar pattern with previous results using Teachman‘s index in Table 20.  
Table 21. Results of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models: 
Internal Density, External Range, and Network Performance Equations: Blau index 
 
 
a. Blau‘s (1977) index 
b. Entries are unstandardized coefficients  
c. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < .10, **p <. 05, ***p < .01 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that different types of diversity have different impacts on 
performance. Specifically, deep-level diversity will have a bigger impact on performance 
than diversity in terms of surface-level characteristics. To test the magnitude of different 
types of diversity on performance, standardized coefficients in the previous SURE model 
were calculated. The bar charts in Figure 9 show a comparison of the magnitudes of 
effects for different types of diversity. This figure shows that only organizational 
membership diversity significantly increased network performance. Also, the 
standardized coefficient of membership diversity was actually higher than that of gender 
diversity. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported.  
Figure 9. Effects of Network Member Diversity on Network Performance, by Type of 
Diversity 
 
            Network Effectiveness                                          Network Fairness 
 
**p<.05 ***p<0.01 
 
I analyzed the network performance model in two equations. Hypothesis 4 and 5 
predict the direct effects of social capital on performance. Social capital variables were 
expected to have positive relationships with performance, but they were not statistically 
significant.  
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
Gender 
diversity 
Organizational 
membership 
diversity** S
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
 S
U
R
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
Gender diversity Organizational 
membership 
diversity*** 
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
 S
U
R
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
 
 
95 
Hypothesis 6 posits that internal density and external range would act as 
mediators between network member diversity and performance. The results revealed that 
the conditions for mediation were partially satisfied for the relationship between range 
and network effectiveness and network fairness but not for the relationship between 
internal density and any performance measures. The indirect effects of internal density do 
not appear to mediate the relationship between gender diversity and network 
effectiveness (beta= -0.177, ns) and the relationship between organizational membership 
diversity and effectiveness (beta= 0.016, ns). For network fairness, internal density 
showed partial mediation effects. Although density had a significant effect on the gender-
fairness relationship (beta = -0.320, p < 0.1), it had a nonsignificant effect on the 
membership diversity-fairness relationship (beta = 0.029, ns).  
External range had partial indirect effects on the relationship between diversity 
and performance. I found the mediating effects of external range not on the relationship 
between gender diversity and network effectiveness (beta = -0.082, ns), but on the 
relationship between organizational membership diversity and effectiveness (beta = 0.063, 
p < 0.1). In the model using network fairness as a dependent variable, I found that 
external range did not mediate the effect of gender diversity on fairness (beta = 0.245, ns), 
but mediated the effect of organizational membership diversity on fairness (beta = -0.187, 
p < 0.001). Based on these results, both Hypothesis 6-1 and 6-2 were partially supported. 
Hypothesis 7 concerned the moderating influence of network management 
behavior (mobilizing/synthesizing) on the relationship between social capital and 
network performance. As explained in Chapter 2, mobilizing behaviors are to ―develop 
support for network processes from network participants and stakeholders‖ (e.g., 
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publicizing the MPO‘s goals and accomplishments) and sythesizing behaviors are to 
―enhance the conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network participants‖ 
(e.g., creating trust among policy board members) (McGuire, 2002, pp. 602-603). The 
third and fourth columns in Table 20 assess the interaction effects and explore whether 
social capital variables and network management behaviors interact in terms of their 
effects on network performance. Among four interaction variables, three interactions 
were statistically significant for network effectiveness. The effect of internal density was 
qualified by significant mobilizing x internal density interaction (beta = -4.44, p < 0.05) 
and synthesizing x internal density interaction (beta = 4.457, p <0.05) with respect to 
network effectiveness. This has two implications: (1) when an MPO has both a dense 
structure and more mobilizing management behaviors, there is a negative effect on 
overall network effectiveness; and (2) when a MPO has a dense network structure among 
board members and more mobilizing behaviors, there is an additional contribution to 
effectiveness.  
Although the mobilizing x external range interaction was nonsignificant (beta = 
4.851, p = 0.115), the synthesizing x external range interaction was significant (beta = -
7.961, p < 0.05). Regarding network fairness, the results indicated significant interaction 
effects between external range and network management behaviors (for mobilizing, beta 
= 7.779, p < 0.05 and for synthesizing, beta = -15.021, p < 0.01).  
In sum, although both types of network management behaviors matter for MPO 
effectiveness (for mobilizing, beta= -0.489, p < 0.1 and for synthesizing, beta=1.001, p < 
0.001) and fairness (for mobilizing, beta= -0.712, p < 0.001 and for synthesizing, beta= 
1.039, p < 0.001), their influences are different when network structures are considered. 
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The impact of network structure (density and range) on performance diminishes or 
increases depending on the type of network management behaviors. 
Each interaction showed consistent direction and pattern across two equations (i.e., 
effectiveness and fairness), but the results of interaction warranted further examination. 
For example, with respect to network effectiveness, three of four interactions were 
statistically significant but it was difficult to interpret the overall impact of network 
management behaviors because the signs of their coefficients were different. It is 
interesting to note that the results demonstrated positive interaction effects between 
synthesizing and internal density and between mobilizing and external range, but 
negative interactions between mobilizing and internal density and between synthesizing 
and external range. To better understand the meaning of each coefficient on these effects, 
I ran additional analytical procedures. 
First, I plotted those interaction effects to further illustate the moderating effect of 
network management behavior (Figure 10). When synthesizing behavior in the MPO was 
high, internal density led to effectiveness, but when sythesizing behavior was low, 
external range (more structural holes) was more valuable. When mobilizing behavior was 
high, MPO effectiveness was higher with a high level of internal density than low.  
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Figure 10. Interactive Effect of Network Management Type (Mobilizing/Synthesizing) 
and Social Capital (Internal density/External range) on Network Effectiveness 
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Figure 11. Interactive Effect of Network Management Type 
(Mobilizing/Synthesizing)and Social Capital (Internal density/External range) on 
Network Fairness 
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Second, although this was not directly hypothesized, one important and practical 
question here is which type of management behaviors would be more useful for MPO 
performance. I explored this question by comparing two scenarios:  
Scenario1: When an MPO engages more in synthesizing behavior, 
how much is its performance changed?  
 
Scenario2: When an MPO increases its mobilizing behavior, how 
much is its performance changed? 
Figure 12 provides the results of simulations exploring this question. To calculate 
the impact of each type of network management behavior on network effectiveness, I 
reached Equation (1) using the coefficients of the previous SUR results. Equations (2) 
and (3) showed the marginal effect of each type of network management behavior. As 
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seen in the equations, the impact of network management depends on internal density and 
external range. Using the value of internal density and external range from each MPO in 
my sample, I calculated the impact of each type of management and then compared the 
two scores for better performance.  
Y= -0.489M+1.001S-0.56ID+1.142ER-4.44ID*M+4.457ID*S+4.851ER*M-
7.961ER*S…………………………………….…………..Equation (1) 
 
where Y (Network effectiveness), ID (Internal density), ER (External range), M 
(Moblizing behavior), S (Synthesizing behavior) 
 
 ………….. Equation (2)  
  ………….. Equation (3) 
Figure 12. Impact of Network Management by Internal Density and External Range: 
Network Effectiveness 
 
Note: Each circle and square represents a different MPO in the sample.  
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Figure 12 shows the result of comparison of each MPO in my sample. MPOs 
represented by squares are more effective when using mobilizing management behavior 
such as establishing member commitment to the MPO‘s mission and publicizing the 
MPO‘s goals and accomplishments. This figure demonstrates that mobilizing behavior 
would be more appropriate for MPOs in my sample. I followed the same procedure for 
calculating the impact of network management on fairness.  
Y= -0.712M+1.039S- 1.012ID -3.397ER-1.742ID*M+3.068ID*S+7.779ER*M-
15.021ER*S                         …………..Equation (4) 
 
where Y (Network fairness), ID (Internal density), ER (External range), M (Moblizing 
behavior), S (Synthesizing behavior) 
 
 ………….. Equation (5)  
  ………….. Equation (6) 
The result revealed similar pattern with Figure 12. MPOs in the sample obtain 
higher level of fairness when engaging in mobilizing behavior. A summary of analysis 
results is presented in Table 22.  
Before proceeding to the next chapter, let me briefly consider some 
methodological issues that could bias these SUR results. SUR estimation is a type of 
General Least Square (GLS) estimation. The GLS estimator is expected to be consistent 
and thus it may be shown to have asymptotic properties (Kennedy, 2008). Because of the 
small number of samples used here, however, it might be hard to expect consistent 
coefficients from SUR. For a robustness check, I ran both OLS regression and SUR. 
Overall, the directions of coefficient signs across these two methods were the same 
¶Y
¶M
= -6.388-1.742´ ID+ 7.779´ER
¶Y
¶S
=12.063+3.068´ ID-15.021´ER
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except for the gender diversity-external range relationship. In both estimations, 
organizational membership diversity had statistically significant and positive 
relationships with external range and network performance, while gender diversity had 
nonsignificant effects on social capital and performance variables. Both OLS and SUR 
results, however, had the potential for endogeneity problem. For example, if any of the 
omitted variables explaining network performance were related with social capital 
variables, then the estimates of social capital could generate biased coefficients. 
Moreover, a set of equations in the SUR consists of simultaneous causal relations. For 
instance, social capital variables are dependent variables in the first and second equation 
as well as independent variables in the last equation. Thus, we should be cautious when 
interpreting causal relation between social capital and network performance without 
further identification strategy.  
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Table 22. Summary of Results 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
Achieving network performance is a vital goal in response to the increase of inter-
organizational networks public organizations involve. The primary aim of this research 
was to examine the factors that predict performance in public management networks by 
disentangling the idea that collaboration requires both diversity and unity. This 
contributes to both the diversity and the network literature by applying group diversity 
and social capital theory to inter-organizational networks to explain network performance.  
Understanding diversity and structural characteristics that explain collaborative 
performance and their collaborative decision-making process help to increase 
collaborative performance. Although diversity, social capital and management behavior 
are expected to affect network performance in pivotal ways, the complexity of the 
relationships among the factors causes challenges for analysis (Larsson et al., 1998; 
Parkhe, 1993). Literatures that have developed relatively independently all need to be 
brought to bear on the problem (Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001). Thus, this 
dissertation has examined how network members‘ diversity, social capital and network 
management behaviors influenced inter-organizational network performance by 
extending Reagans and Zuckerman‘s (2001) framework. The findings in this dissertation 
provide some preliminary evidence for addressing several important issues.  
6.1 Findings and Implications 
First, empirical results in this research showed that organizational membership 
diversity affects network performance, whereas gender diversity does not. MPOs diverse 
in organizational membership were more likely to have more structural holes (i.e., range). 
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Density and structural holes had important implications for performance because 
diversity in gender and organizational membership affect network performance through 
these network-based social capital variables. Thus, MPO directors and board members 
may seek to consider interaction patterns among MPO members to increase performance.  
Interestingly, this research found that gender diversity had no significant impact 
on social capital variables and network performance. These results are contrary to those 
of conceptual studies in group diversity theory that considered gender diversity as a 
crucial determinant of group performance. As explained in the previous chapter, each 
MPO policy board member met regularly as a top-level representative of his/her 
organization and played a role as a final decision maker. Previous studies in group 
diversity tend to focus on work groups in organizations, as opposed to inter-
organizational networks; however, the policy board members may not be characterized 
by the daily routine work interaction of groups in organizations. Hence, in this context, 
the importance of surface-level diversity (e.g., gender) may be less apparent than that of 
deep-level diversity (e.g., organizational culture).  
Moreover, the results of this study are consistent with those of some previous 
empirical studies. For example, Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) found no effect for 
tenure diversity, although they found significant impacts for network variables. This adds 
support to the strategy of exploring the impact of the network processes that underlie 
theories of the diversity-performance relationship.  
The findings also support the claim that the congruence assumption in the 
literature that needs to be better investigated. Previous literature has presumed that a 
network structure (i.e., interaction patterns among actors) necessarily reflects actors‘ 
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demographic characteristics (Burt, Horgarth & Michaud, 2000). In other words, 
demographic diversity and network patterns are treated as ―congruent.‖ However, 
Lawrence (1997) indicated this congruence assumption is not appropriate in most 
organizational settings. This research found gender composition in the policy boards is 
independent of the interaction among the board members.  
Second, although the findings were partially supported, this research indicated the 
intervening impact of network-based social capital variables on the relationship between 
network member diversity and performance. This research was also able to demonstrate 
that network management behaviors influenced the strength of relationships between 
network-based social capital variables and network performance. For example, an MPO 
with dense structure is negatively associated with MPO performance. Its negative impact 
on performance increases when the MPO engages more in mobilizing behaviors to 
develop support for network processes from network actors and stakeholders. On the 
other hand, internal density plays a role in enhancing network performance when an 
MPO engages more in synthesizing behaviors. The direction of each interaction effect 
was consistent for both network performance measures (i.e., effectiveness and fairness). 
These observed interaction effects of mobilizing and synthesizing behavior supported the 
notion that the optimal network-based social capital is needed to decide managerial 
reaction in each MPO. To examine the overall impact of network management strategy 
on performance, I have provided the simulation results. In my sample, a mobilizing 
strategy was found to be more effective in improving performance than a synthesizing 
behavior is.  
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To date, a limited amount of research has investigated both structural and 
behavioral aspects of networks together to explain network performance (O‘Toole & 
Meier, 2011). O‘Toole and Meier (2011) viewed it as ―important to take both into 
account in any comprehensive understanding of the network theme in public management. 
Inter-governmental management, in particular, involves a consideration of both‖ (p. 246). 
Although their research context is at the team level (rather than the network), Balkundi 
and colleagues (2006) further argued, ―the network approach, to extent that it captures the 
social structure of the team, may contribute to a better understanding of team 
performance that is possible from the demography approach‖ (p. 254). 
There are multiple types of diversity, which influence performance 
simultaneously (Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Pelled et al., 1999; Jackson & Joshi, 
2010). Most researchers in the field of group diversity have tended to focus on the 
isolated dimensions of diversity instead of differentiating among the types of diversity. 
This research takes a multi-dimensional approach; empirically assessing both surface- 
and deep-level diversity provides new insights and thereby, contributes to the existing 
diversity literature. In particular, this research provides understanding of when and how 
different types of diversity (i.e., gender and organizational membership) have more or 
less positive effects on network performance. Upon considering interaction patterns 
among MPO members and their network behaviors, this study found that organizational 
membership diversity had more effects than gender diversity. As mentioned before, this 
result may be related to the extent to which the network members work together. To the 
extent that MPO boards desire more MPO effective and fair decision-making processes, 
there may be advantages in mixing together individuals from more diverse organizations.    
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With respect to the network management literature, this research extends the 
attempts to better understand how different types of network management behaviors 
(both mobilizing and synthesizing behaviors) have moderating effects on network 
performance, and which types of network management behaviors would be more useful 
for metropolitan planning organizations. Although a considerable number of studies in 
the field of urban planning have discussed transportation planning issues, very few are 
interested in regional collaboration through the perspective of public management beyond 
the technical issues. This dissertation is a small step toward emphasizing the importance 
of participants‘ leadership and management strategies for successful regional 
collaborations. With examining conditional effects—social capital and network 
management—this research extends traditional main-effects research on diversity (i.e., 
diversity-performance relationship) in the inter-organizational setting. This understanding 
might provide metropolitan planning organizations with more insight into their 
organizations‘ functionality.  
A great deal of recent social network research has focused on egocentric networks, 
but there has been less focus on the structural properties of bounded networks and 
performance (Cummings & Cross, 2003). This research focuses not on how individuals 
structure their networks for individual advantage but on how the composition of the 
network and interactions among individual organizations within the network affect 
network performance. Because this research takes the network (i.e., MPO) as the unit of 
analysis, we can address the question of how MPO performance is impacted by more or 
less density and structural holes among MPO policy board members. This question 
redirects attention from individuals‘ patterns of ties to the composition of the network. 
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Thus, the ―whole network‖ approach of this research gives additional insights to existing 
knowledge.  
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Because of the small sample size consisting of 34 MPOs, the findings of this 
research should be considered in the context of some methodological caveats. The 
statistical tests may be unstable, and the lack of statistical power may lead to the rejection 
of true hypotheses. Increasing the sample size would remedy this potential problem, 
although collecting data using this whole network approach requires extensive work 
(Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). The results of this dissertation are preliminary in the 
sense that more samples would be required to validate any of the present conclusions. I 
did perform several tests for normality distribution and used multiple sources of data to 
avoid inflated correlations because of mono-method bias, but interpretation of the 
findings should be made with caution. As briefly discussed in Chapter 5, the results have 
possible endogeneity problems of some explanatory variables. Future studies should draw 
attention to this issue and consider possible ways, such as instrumental variable 
estimation. 
Second, although the model in this research included two MPO-level covariates as 
controls, those may not be comprehensive to control ―unobserved heterogeneity‖ across 
MPOs. Because of the small number of observations, this study did not consider other 
possible control variables for parsimonious parameters. For example, the geographic 
density of metropolitan area governments may be included. To measure the geographic 
distribution of local governments, it is appropriate to use the distance between the center 
points of each local government in a metropolitan area calculated by geographic 
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information system (GIS). This measure is perceived as an ideal measure of local 
government density (Post, 2002).  
As one respondent noted in the survey, the project selection process might be 
quite subjective when final selection occurs, although the project selection process uses 
data as a foundation by using a point ranking system. Seventy-three percent of MPO 
directors in the sample indicated there are no informal procedures for the decision-
making process, but the rest indicated they have a number of informal meetings with the 
jurisdictions, or there are occasional workshops where the members digest information, 
discuss options and bring those discussions back to an official MPO meeting where 
decisions are made. Much of the negotiation that takes place might not be structured in a 
formal decision-making process. Thus, in-depth study on informal meetings of MPO 
boards is encouraged to investigate a complete picture on the collaborative decision-
making process, in the future.  
Because of data availability constraints, this research considered only two types of 
diversity—gender and organizational membership. Future research needs to include other 
kinds of surface- and deep-level diversity such as ethnicity, tenure and value, and 
examine how they affect social capital and performance at the network level.  
This dissertation focused on the collaborative decision-making behaviors of MPO 
policy board members as final decision makers on transportation fund allocations, but 
future studies should be interested in the activities of other committees—technical 
advisory and citizen advisory committees—and how they (both directly and indirectly) 
participate in the decision-making process and how their behaviors affect MPO 
performance.  
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This research examined MPOs as networks at one point in time. Although survey 
data used in this research is cross-sectional, the fact that this research collected network 
data over a 12 month timeframe from the point when the surveys were completed lends 
some credence to the assumption that the findings are a reflection of the interplay of 
diversity and network-based social capital preceding performance. But reporting the same 
networks in a longitudinal setting and comparing the network characteristics and results 
would provide information on how the networks are evolved. For example, it would be 
interesting to know whether they show a static or dynamic pattern and when the MPOs 
change their network management strategies. This line of empirical studies is extremely 
under-researched in the literature (Provan, Huang & Milward, 2009).  
In addition, this research focuses on only one policy setting, which limits the 
generalization of findings. Similar findings in another policy area or type of network 
would reinforce the findings of this research. Although I believe the results in this 
research are meaningful for other formalized inter-organizational networks, it might be 
difficult to argue that they would work the same for voluntary, less structured networks.  
Finally, in their open-ended responses, MPO directors commented that they need 
workshop and educational training for policy board members on transportation planning 
procedures. Policy board members who answered the survey also wanted training 
opportunities for better decision making. Given this finding, it is important to investigate 
the role of training on MPO decision making in future research. 
I view my results as preliminary. Nonetheless, this study suggests an important 
evidence of the interactive effects between network management behaviors and structural 
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properties of networks on performance; it also contributes to the existing knowledge of 
inter-organizational dynamics in transportation planning networks. 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR MPO DIRECTORS 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR POLICY BOARD MEMBERS 
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